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Abstract
Studies have shown tha i in large physical syste ms. it is possible 10e liminate or
reduce costly mach ine fail ures. equi pment downtime. 1051 prod uction and dec reased
revenues by keeping abreast ot'the most erfecuveandcurrent rnainrenance techniques
ava ilable.
The purpose oft his thesis is 10 propose a mult i-fac eted approach to maintenance
which can add ress the sha n comin gs of convent ional approac hes 10 ma intenan ce .
The pro posed memodology co mbines the reliab ility-ce ntered ma intenance
technique (Re M) . a fault tree anal ysis. a database system. and the Weibull ana lysis. The
integration o f these techniq ues prod uces an innovat ive system which increases the
reliability and ava ilability ofthe system, To the author's know ledge. this integrated
app roach has nOI be n done before.
As an exa mple. the heating . ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC l of large
build ings was used to illustra te this methodo logy . Failure data was co llected from the
Biotechnolo gy. Arts and Administr::uion Extension and Earth Reso urces Bui ld ings of
Memorial University ofNewtoundland (CERR ) ove r a six year period. The data included
the time to failure and fa ilure modes for each component within the centra l HVAC
system. The collected data wasused to quant ify the reliability of the system. A
probabilistic analysis based on the Weibull distribu tion was used to analyze the lime to
failure data.
Using reliability-centered maintenance 10 identify the causes and impact of
failures. the informat ion acqui red was used to develop fault trees. Failure modes
identified in the fault trees were coded as identifie rs to be used in a knowledge-based
system for improving the reliability and availability of the system and its components.
It was shown that system reliability can be improved by increas ing the reliability
of each compo nent utilizing the proposed mul ti-faceted approach. Failure data analys is
enabled us to quantify the reliability lor many sub-compo nents within the major
components that constitu te the HVAC system.
It is concluded Ihat the developed knowledge-based system ena bles us 10
troubleshoot causes o ftailure at a much fast er rate and this will decrease the down time
and increase the avai lability ofthe system.
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C ha pter I Introdu ction
1.1 Pr oblem Identificati on
1.1.1 l"eed for a n Int egrated Approach to the Mai ntena nce of
Lar ge Systems
Largo:systems such as the heating. ventilating and air conditioning system
(HVAC) in a large bui lding. such as a hospital or university. normall y consist of
thousands of components that are interconnected. Failu re o f such system s can be
catastro phic espec ially in intensive care wards. opera ting rooms. or in sensitive
research laboratories . II is essen tial that such systems are pro perly maint ained and
work reliab ly. By keep ing abreast of the:most effective and curre nt mainte nance
techniq ues available. we C311eliminate or reduce cos tly mach ine failures.
equipm ent downtime . 10SIprod uction and dec rease d revenues . Statis tics
published by Main tenance Technology International ofCa[~ary (MTI) [n.d .I have
identified large unnecessary expenditures resulting from alack o f maintenance . In
Canada . lin: billion dollars an: spent because of poor lubrica tion practices which
can be easily resolved. but which are ignored because maintenance personnel tend
to think these problems are normal. In addi tion. two hundred billion dollar! an:
lost annually by North American compa nies due to wear caused by inadequate
maintena nce .
Oth er fac tors that contribute to high mai ntenanc e costs are inappropriate
ins pection schedules. incorrec t servici ng. poor cost account ing. im prope r USC'of
preventive mai ntenanc e techniques. poor lubrican t selectio n and application. poor
contamination control methods and inadeq ua te use o f main tenan ce staff
In recent years . industry expecta tion of maintenance and maintenanc e
tech niques has changed enormously. During the 19-1O's and the 1950's. the policy
was -t lx it when it breaks" . During the I%O's and the 1970's. the techniques used
were scheduled overhau ls (Mc ubray. 199 I I wit h planning and control or work
be ing achieved using big and slow computers. In the meantime. indus try
demanded higher plan t availab ility. longer equip ment life . and lowe r costs"
Durin g the 19&O's and 1990's. the industry expec tations shifted towards higher
p lant availability and reliability. greate r safety, bene r prod uct qual ity. less da mage
to the environment, longer equi pment life. and great er cost effectiven ess . To meet
the new de mands . new maintenan ce techniques have been develo ped. inc luding :
co ndition monitoring. design for reliabi lity and main tainab ility. hazardstudies.
and failu re modes and effec ts analyses. Other techniques such as expert systems.
mu ltiskill ing. and teamwo rk have not been used effective ly because very e tten
they an: used in isolation from eac h othe r. There have been many research papers
written on main tena nce ofindividual pieces or equipment using speci fic
techniq ues bUI deta iled main tenance stud ies cf large sys tems are limited and are
usuall y co n lined to specif icprojec ts for spec ific industries. Then: is a need to
study t~ integration of design. construction, operatio n, maintenance and redesign
ufla rge systems using a number ofcurrently ava ilable techniq ues. This integrated
approac h is supported by Moore and Rath (1999) and Tesdah l and Tamlingscn
(199 8).
In view of the urgent need to r a rational app roach 10 maintenance of large
systems. this thesis proposes a multi-faceted approach 10 maintenance which will
prove to bemore reliable man curren t practices.
1.1.2 Cur rent Problems with HVAC Systems
In Canada. every bui ll environment has a Heating. Ventila ting and Air-
Conditioning system in place. Hospital operaung rooms. tor example. require
special HVAC systems to maintain positive pressure and to stop bacteria (rum
contam inating me internal environment . On the other hand. laboratory HVAC
systems maintain negative pressure in order to avoid bacteria propagation to other
areas. The HVAC systems lo r office towers became a major concern in recent
years because o ft he Indoor Air Quality issue as slated by Morey (IQ88) and Chow
(1987). The number of related complaints has increased with the construct ion of
tighter sealed buildings. me growing use of synthetic materials. and the application
or eno:rgy conservation measures that reduce the amount of outside air being
circu lated. \ Iodem office equipm ent (photocopiers. laser printers. computers
etc.), cleaning products. and the outdoo r air pcllut icn can also increase the levels
o f indoor air contamina tion. The reactions to indoor contaminan ts have led to ttl.:
phcnomenon ofsick bui lding syndro me. Therefore. there is a defin ite need to
ensure thai HVAC sys tems are functioning prope rly at all times during the
occupanc y period and thai unschedul ed shutdown s are minimized.
Maintenance experts who are capable ofana lyzing and solving HVAC
problems are in short supply. Most engineers learn through on-the-job trai ning in
this area. The HVAC area requires solid fundamental knowledge of applied
thermodynamic s. heat transfer. tluid mechanic s. and tluid powe r. Further. at the
ope rator level. training is limited by the absence of solid fundamenta ls in the
traini ng programs. As a result. most of the HVAC systems an: poorly operated or
maintained. and many owners and end users do nOI believe thcy can work as
etfic ieruly ;IS promised.
1.1.3 :\Ia intenance Aspects of HVAC Systems
Smit h (1993) states that. in most loca tions. proactive maintenanc e is less
than suffi cien t in current practice. In order 10 ..-nsure increased product ivity and
e fficie ncy. there must be a proper proac tive maintenance program in place. The
need tor repetitiv e correc tion is a conc ern as many companies do not have a
system in place to track do..vn recurring proble ms. Rather than finding the sou rce
o f the problem. only the appare nt symptom is correc ted. Broussard ( 199~)
describ,..d the methodo logy used 10 preserve failure data and then used it in
conductin g Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCF A). This is a very important step
used for continuous quality improvement in the maintenanc e o f systems . Often
times, mctruenaoce is carried out in a haphazar d fashion and areas that shou ld be
o fc oncern are overloo ked in favour of obvious prob lems. In add ition . within
companies. main tenance practic es in one area wil! vary sig nificantly from those:in
another area (i.e .• separate build ings]. !'vlaintcnance practices with in an
organization should beconsis tent.
At times. mainten ance is carried out by people who are nor thoroughly
familia r with the intended function of each componen t. As a result. they do not
maintain equipme nt functio ns at their designed levels. Scheduled maim enance
can on...n be both unnecessary andconservat ive. Maintenance items lower on a
scale orimportance may get much attent ion due to th...ease o f do ing it. whereas
those areas req uiring more attentio n and hence more work . are relegated to a less
consistent schedule. Likewi se a compan y may avoid preventative main tenance as
it may beerroneously perceived as too great a 1.'05t.
If preventative maintenanc e is to besuccessful. it must be visi ble and
recorded on an operating time bas is. Hence. it can bereferenced for its
e ffec tiveness and altered to suit the actua l maimenance that is requ ired over time.
A compan y sho uld se t up its own maintenance program which exceeds or falls
short of manu facturer ' s recommended main tenance input based on actua l
ope rating cond itions . There is often a varianc e betwee n maintenance of similar
units .
T here should bestanda rd proced ures and check points in place for
mai ntenance o f identical units. Pred icti ve maintenance methodology presentl y is
cu rrently rare ly used in HVAC system s.
Reliability-Centered Maintenance methodology that req uires a
combination ofengineering and technical sk ills. as well as management awarenes s
and mot ivation. offers the most syst ematic and efficie nt process 10 address an
overal l programmatic ap proach to opti mizat ion of HVAC sys tems. A sol ution [0
many otthe pro blems associ ated with the HVAC sys tems wou ld reduc e sic kness.
create a bette r working envirc nmern. reduce ~n~rgy consumption. and lowe r
maintenance cost. Therefo re. there is an immediate need to develop an ex pert
syst em 10 hdp owners andusers opti mize the (unct ion of HVAC systems .
1.2 Aims and Obj ectives
To addr ess the common maintenan ce problem s staled in Secti on 1.1. the aim IJf
this work is to integrate ReM (Reliability-Centered Main tenance) tec hniques with a
knowledg e- based sys tem techn iques to provide decision-support for optim izing HVAC
~ysterns uvailability. und lowe ring maintenance COSIS. The detailed object ives of this
th...-sis are:
To apply the Re M maintenance program which sirnuhaneously
reduces both the probability of critical failure in HVAC systems
and maintenance costs by reducing scheduled maintenance .
To develop a decis ion-sup port tool lor optimized operational and
maintenance procedures.
To provide a tool to enable maintenance personnel to understand
the functions and performan ce standards of installed HVAC
systems.
To provide a tool to promote total integration of design .
construction, set up commissioning . operation and maintenance of
IlVAC systems.
To promote predictive and preventive maintenance tasks in lieu of
the convent ional definite time span maintenance.
1.3 Outline of Thesis
The:background of the thesis has been presented in the previous section alon~ with
the:objec tives of the study. The:followi ng chapter l'C, 'iews the relevant literature as it
relates to RCM. fault tree analysis. planned maintenance. conditional based maintenance
and redesign. the new parad igm lor maintenance management . lhe root cause fa ilure
analysis. and to knowledge-based systems.
Application of RCM 10 acquire the functions and performance standard s oft he
installed HVAC system will idenlitYthe intended function and the functional failure
mode. and at the same time observe the cause and effect ctthe failure mode. The
acquired information from ReM is transfo rmed into graphical represemnlon using a fault
tree. This graphical represenu aicn is easy to use by the operation and maintenance
perso nnel. Based ..10 the fault tree. mathematical models an: developed to determ ine the
componen t failure cause..d by the various failure modes. The failure modes are codedand
sron-d in a data base system. The coded failure modes arc combined with Weibull
analysis using collected failure data to predict the probability of' failure. Th is method
quanti fies the failure mode based on actual usage and therefore is more scientific than the
scheduled maintenance method. The developed data base system can beused as a
decision tool for trouble shooting. To illustrate this methodology. failu re data was
collected and ana l ~ s..-d from HVAC systems located in three buildings at Memoria l
University of Newfoundland. This established the parameters tor Weibull distribut ion
and the failure modes for the knowledge-based system . The resul ts of the analy sis po int
out tho:im pact of design and construc tion on the re liability of the syst em. and how this
affec ts the mainte nance and operatio n of the system. Th is analysis also points oc r the
misuse of conditional based techn iques and how effec tive use of pred ictive and
conditional based techniques can beused to optimize the system rel iability .
Cha pter 2 Review of Literature
In order to fulfil l the research objec tives outli ned in Section 1.1. a review a l'
literature was necessary to gain the state ofth e art knowledge in this particular area . This
chapter summarize s the literature review in maintenance cost. ReM . Expe rt Systems. and
optimiza tion techniques as related 10 the develop ment of a ReM Expert System.
2.1 Maintenance Cost
Estimating maintenance costs was discussed by He wel l and Kluezny t \982) who
pointed out that two approac hes may be used by HVA,C maintenance dec ision makers to
derive the n..~'\.'Ssar~.. maintenance cost info rmation: the Engineering Requirements
Method and t~ Historical Da13Method. The Engineering Requirements Method
establis hes lh< I) pe and timing afthe maintenance effort irum an engineering analysis of
the system components. Using this approach. the rare of component dete riorat ion must be
calculable in order to arrive at rel iable esti mates o f syste m failure costs. Unfortun atel y.
this method is \"Crydifficul t 10 implement due to the high cost of perfo rming engineering
anctvses. and the lack o f reliability specifications from vendors. The second approach is
to rdy on historical data to project future cos ts. The data may be the expe rience of a
singfe use r analyzing.his or her o...vn data or it may be the accum ulated experien ce of
many users sharing their data in a data base . This method o ffers 3. practical al ternat ive to
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the Engin~ring Requirements Method for most HVAC ownerzoperarcrs. Unfo rtunately.
it is not without its O\ \TI disadv antages such as the availabil ity, accurac y. and consistency
o f historical data .
Dohrmann and Alereza ( 1986) obtained maintenance costs and HVAC system
information from 342 buildi ngs located in 35 states in the United Sta tes. In 1983 U.S
do llars. Jam collected showed a mean HVAC system maintenance cost of S3 AO/m~ per
year. with a mediancosro f S2.6OIm: per year. Theage uf the building hasa statistic ally
significant but minor eff ect on HVAC maintenance costs. wben analyzed by geographic
location, the data revealed that location does not signitica mly affect maintenance costs.
Ana lysis also indic ated that building size is not stat istically significant in exp lain ing cos t
variation. The equation o f Dohrman & Alereza is given by:
C total annual building HVAC maintenance cos t ( $/m l )
SJ .59/rn: + O.OI9n"T" h + c+ d (2.1)
where.
U.OIQ
base system maintenance costs
age adjustment fact or
age in yecrs
healing system adjus tment factor It
cooling system adjustment factor c
distribution syste m adjus tment factor d
"
Values foradjusunenl factors h.c. and d can beobtained from the 1999 ASHRAE
Handboo k (Sf) on page 35.4,
The esnrnate can be adjusted to curren t dollars by multiplying the maimenancc
cost estimate by the current Consumer Price Index (CPO divided by the CP I in July 1983.
In July 1983. lhe CPI was 100.1. Monthly CPI statistics arc recorded in Survey of Current
Business (U.S. Department o f Commerce). The estimating method is limited 10one
equipm ent variable per situation. That is. the method can estimate maintenance costs to r
.:1building having either a centrifugal chiller or a reciprocating chiller. but not both.
:\ ssessing the e ffects o f combining two or marc types o f equipment within a single
ca tegory requ ires a more complex statistical analysis
Wolfson Mainrenance tl 9'J8) States that decisions made ut an early stage in the
concept and des ign o f an item in a plant can have signilic ant effects on the COSI o frunn ing
that piece of equ ipment throu ghout its life (Figure 2.1 ).
In the preliminary desig n review stage. 1So/"to 3S% of the life cycle cos ts have
been determined . In the concept design review stage. ::!su'O to 40% of the life cycle costs
have been determined In the critical design review stage. 95% oft he life cycle costs have
been determined .
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The designer must beaware of the conseque nces c thieher decisions. If lor
instance. a bearing is installed in an inaccessible posuic n, that bearing " 111 certainly have
to be chan ged a number of limes during the life time of' the equip ment. Due to me
difficulty of access. excessive replaceme nt costs will be incurred. If this inaccessible
positio n is unavoidable, the installation of a top quality and/or an oversize bearing. will
increase the purchase costs but may reduce the overa ll life cycle cost . The same applies
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during the operating life in the purchas ing of spare parts . maintenance tool s, and training
of operato rs and rnaintainers.
2.2 Reliability-Cente red Maintenance (RCM)
2.2.1 Overview
Reliability is the probab ility that a plant or component will not ta il to
perform accordi ng to certain specific ations during a given time per iod wo rking in
a stared environment. Reliability -Centered Maintenance (ReM) implies that the
maintena nce func tion must be recused on assurin g reliability in equ ipme nt and
syste ms. ReM calls tor an analysis for determin ing maintenance needs .
RC\1 grew from stud ies carried out during the develo pment o f the Boei ng
7~7 . This work showed that the failure modes ofaircraft components are
randomly dom inated. At this time aircraft maintenance was based predomin ately
o n flying hours. therefo re. a new method o f maintaining aircraft was considered
appropriate.
The RC ~I app roach assum es no prior knowledge of the com ponent s. a
so-called zero-based or first principles approach. Each compo nent in the a ircraft
was systema tically ana lyzed to identify their failure modes (caus es oftailure! and
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app rop riate ma intenanc e tasks were then assigned . Moubrcy (1991) states that this
ana lysis is carried out by asking the fo llowing seven questio ns about each asset :
( I ) What are the functions and associa ted performance standards of the
asse t in its present operating context?
(2 ) In what "lays does it fail to fulfill its functions ?
lJI What C3U~ each functional tailu re?
141 What happens when each failure occ urs?
(51 In what way does each failure matter?
(61 What can bedone 10prevent eac h failu re?
(7) Wh at if a suitable prevent ive task cannot be found'!
Ih cse questio ns are required in order II,) fu lly capture the information
needed to design the appropria te maintenance regime .
2.2.2 Development of ReM
In the late 1950·s. the FAA (Federal Avimion Agencyj.whlch was
responsib le for regula ting airline maintenance pracuces in the U.S.A. . was
frust rated by experiences sbowi ng thai it was not possible to corurcl the Illl
(failu re density) ofcertain unreliab le types of engines by any feasible changes in
either the content or frequency o f scheduled o verhauls. In (960 a task te rce was
formed co nsisting 01representatives from both the FAA and airl ines to investigate
the capabilities of prevent ive maintenance. As a result. 3. F..<\NlndusU1'
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Relia bility Program wasestablished. the mandate o f wh ich was to develop a
program towards the control of reliability throug h an analysis of the factors that
affec t reliabi lity. This approac h was a direct cha llenge to the traditiona l concept
that the length of time between successive overhauls of an item was an imporunt
factor in control ling its fail ure rate . The find ings of this sludy were :
Scheduled overhaul haslinte etfect on the overall reliab ility of a
complex item unless the item has a dom inant failure mode (cause:
of failure).
There arc many items lo r wh ich there is no effective form of
scheduled maintenance.
.-\ rudimentary decision-diagram technique \ \:1$ devised in I%:5and in
June 1967 a paper on its usc was presen ted at the ATA Com mercia l Aircra li
Design and Operation Meeting. The recom mendations wen: included in ATA
(196 9).
In 197~ . the United States Department of Defence commissioned Unitc-d
Airlines to prepare a report on the processes used by the civil aviation industry to
prepa re maintenance programs for aircrans. Ihe resultin g report. known as MSG·
I t Maintenance Steering Group ). was used by specia l teams of industry and F..\A
personnel to develop the firstscheduled-maintenance program based on the
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principles ufReliability-Centered Maintenance. Use of the decision-diagram
technique led to fun her improvements which wert: incorporated two years later in
a second document, MSG-2. The object ive of the techniques outlined in MSG.I
and MSG·2 was [0 develo p a scheduled-maintenance program thai assure d the
maximum safety and reliab ility at the lowest cost . Commenting on the MSG· l
and MSG·::!docume nts. Nowlan and Heap's 1978 report Slated that:
"Although the MSG-l and MSG-2
documents revolutionized the procedure
followed in developing maintenance
programs to r transport aircraft. their
applicatio n to other type of equipment was
limited by their brevity and specialized
locus. In addition. the form ulation of certain
concepts was incomplete. For example. the
decisio n logic began with an evaluation of
proposed tasks. rather than an evaluation of
the failure consequences that determine
whether they are needed. and if so. their
actual purpose . The problem of establishing
task intervals was not addressed. the role of
hidden-function failure was unclear. and the
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treatment of structural maintenan ce was
inadequate. There was also no guidance on
the use of operating informat ion to refine or
modify the initial program aft er th~
equipment entered service or the information
systems needed lor effect ive management of
the on-going program . All these
shortcomings. as well as the need to clarify
man y o f the underlying principle s led to
analy tic proced ures of broader .scope and
their crys tallization into the logical
discipline now known as Reliability.
Centered Maintenance."
Re vl is known as MSG-3 within the aviaticn industry . and to this date it
remains the process used to develop and refine maintenance programs lor all
majo r types of aircrafts .
Currently three versions of the RCM decis ion diag ram are in wide use.
The fi rst is shown on pages 91 and 92 of the report by Nowlan and Heap (1978).
The secon d versio n of the decis ion diagram is the officia l MSG· 3 version
currently used by the:civil aviatio n industry. It is sho....n as the
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"System/ Powerplan t l ogic Diagram" on pages 6 and7 o f the Maintenan ce
Program Development Document published by the ATAA {Air Transport
Assoc iatio n of America ) (1988). In recent years. the environme nt became more
and more of an issue. In 1990. theadd ition of the question. - Does this failure
mode ca use a loss of function or other damage which could breach any known
enviro nmental standard or regulation?" to the RCM decision diagram warrant ed
chang ing its name 10 RCM 2.
2.2.3 What is Reliability-Centered Maintenance?
The Reliability Centered Maintenance process involves the application 0 ( :1
number o f inves tigative procedures to each of the select ed systems .
Foremost among chest is thedete rmination o f the functions and assoc iated
performance standar ds o f the system in its current o~r.lting contex t. This
includ es the full range of functions (primary . secondary . protective devices. and
super flu ous functions): the inherent reliability or buill -in capab ility of the system :
othe r standards including product qual ity, safet y. energy etliden..:y and operati ng
env ironment : operati ng occupancy patterns : and ope rating context tl.e. stand-
alone versus stand-by duty).
Functional failure - or the manner in which. and the extent to which. a
system fails to meet a des ired standard of perrcrmcnce . whether the fai lure be
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partial or total - must likewise be investigated . Having ascertained the manner and
extent of failure. it then becomes critical to identify the probable root causers) o f
the partic ular functional failure mode. Failure modes. and the opera ting context in
which they occur. should be indicated .
The process of analyzing the exten t and the effects of a failure must cover
the full spectrum from the evidence (if any) that a failure has occurre d through to
the procedures necessa ry to effect repair. Full consideration must be given to the
actual or the potentialthreat to safety or to the enviro nment. the anticipat ed range
of potential effects on productio n and operational activ ity. and the actual or
potential physical damage resulting from the failure. The consequ ences ora
functiona l failure will depend. to some extent. on whether the failure is obv ious or
hidden but. in either case. there will bepotential effects relating to safety and the
environment. operational activities and non-operationa l activities.
Predictive and correc tive maintenance must be accompani ed by effective
preventive maintenanc e procedures. includ ing on-condit ion tasks. restoration
tasks. and replacemen t tasks. An equally important compone nt is the
establishment ora course of action to pursue in the event that no suitab le
preventive maintena nce activ ity can be identified. This may include defaul t
actions such as reasses sing the system design or even redesign ing the system. in
pan or in its entirety.
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2.2.4 Difference Between ReM and Plann ed Maintenance
RCM is a process used to determine the maintenance requiremen ts of any
physical ass¢t in its operating context by identify ing the functio ns of the asset.the
causes c t'failu res. and the effects ofth e failures. ReM advoca tes Condition Base
Maintenance lCB M) and reassessing me system design (Redesig n]. Planned
main tenance involves identifying (1) what inspection and/or servicing tasks arc to
bedone and (2 ) when each task should bedone to retain the functional capabili ties
Il l" operating equipment or systems. Planned maintenance usually doe s not include
c n-coeduion moni toring or the reassessment cfsvstem desi gn. Planned
maintenance is the most widely used form c t'mat ntenance. It is based on the
concept that every item on a piece of complex equipment has a " right ag('" ar
which com plete overhaul is necessary to ensure safety and operating reliability. II
is most e ffective if implemented as equip ment begins 10wear out and fail ure
probability increases. Planned maintenance tasks are oflen grouped together into
maintenance downtime or windows 10 minimize the total number of planned
maintenance stoppages per year. This strategy is seriously flawed because the
majority of industrial failure modes are random in nature and so maintenance tasks
based on time will have limited effect in improving equipment perform ance .
21
CBM relies on the fact that themajority of failures do not occur
instantaneously but develop over a period of time as shown in Figure 2.2 P·f
Curve.
The P·f curve shows how a failure starts. deterio rates 10 the point at which
it can be detected (the potential failure point ~P-) . if it is not detected and
corrected. continues 10 deteriorate • usually at an accelerated rote - until it reaches
the point Il l"functional failu re (··F·). The P·f interval can beknown JS the "Lead
Time Til Failure". CBM involves recording some measurement that gives an
indicmiun of machine condition (e.g.• temperature increase on an insulation
surface. vibration increase on a bearing housing). An investigation can then be
carried oUIto identify the exact problem.
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Figure 2.2
Redesign (or design out) can prove to be a very effective method or
solving a recurring problem. However it can easily be iaapprcprictely utilized.
Putting:in a more powerful motor due to frequent tripping may bean ill-thought
out reaction to malpractice by an operator. whilst simple:instruction may solve the
same proble m. Before considering designin!£out a problem. it is important to
identify exactly what the root cause of the problem is. Having identified the root
cause. is it possible to monitor the condition at this problem area? If so. it may be
cos t e ffective to monitor the condition anti take action as necessary. If this is not
the case. can the problem be redesigned" If it CM . what will this involve and can
it have any adverse effects else where? Once the procedure hasbeen thoroughly
developed. the redesign proced ure should beaccepted. Finally. redesign implies
that mistakes or oversights wen: made duri ng the original design of the equipmen t.
Wolfson Maintenance (1998) stated the advantages and disadvantages of
plan ned maintenance. C8 M. and redesign and ate listed in Table 2,1.
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T ab le 2.1 Co m pa ris on o r Plan ned maiDtenan~e. C OM, a nd Red es ig n (Arter
Wo lrsoD.1998l
Pla n ned COM Red es igllMa in'enan~e
Ad vantages • Fail ure reduced. • Maximizes eq uipment - Sc me mino r
• Labor used COSI· ava ilability , design out projec ts
effectiv ely . - Som e forms of can be inexpens ive
· ~Ia i ntenanc<' inspec tio n utilizin g human and guaran teed to
plann ed well in senses can be inexpensive. work .
advance (p rovision
- Allows shutdown before - ..-\recurring
to r labour and seve re dama ge occ urs. pro blem can be
material], - Produc tion can be completely
mod ified to extend unl t resol ved.
life.
• Ca use offuilure can be
analyzed .
- Maint enance can be
planned
- Labour can beorganized.
- Spares can beassemb led .
Dis- • Maintenance - Vib ration moni toring, - The root cause of
advantages act ivity and costs Thennograph and Oil the prob lem may ~et
increased. Debris AnaJysis requ ire missed in the
• l" nnecessary and spec ialized equi pment and exercise.
invas ive training . A com pany mus t • Larger design ou t
maintenance is careful ly chouse the projects can prove
ca rried ou t correc t technique. A to bevery
• Applicable only to periodof time will be expensive
age retared required for trends to • Prod uct ion can be
deterio ratio n. dev elop andthen machine disrupted fo ra
• Mainte nanc e co ndition can be assessed , considerableperi od
sometimes induces of time with larger
failure s {infan t proj ects .
mortalit y] . <T he expe cted
result may nOI
materialize .
• So lving a pro blem
in one area may
overload and cause
prob lems in
anothe r.
2.2.5 Extending the RCM Method to Othe r Complex and Cri tical
Systems
In response to the prob lem. airplane des igners began to develo p design
features that mitigated failure consequences -thnt is. how to des ign ai rplanes that
were "fail ure tolerant". Further. ReM has been applied 10 both the aircraft and the
offsh ore pluttcrm industr ies resulting in cost red uctions with no decrease in
reliabilit y . However. a better understan ding of the failure process in the complex
equipment has actually improved reliability by making it possib le to direc t
preve ntive tusks at specific evidence ofpotential fail ures. Based on the finding s
of years of study by the aircraft industry. such as the MSG-l program for the
Boeing 747. United Airline expended only 66.000 man hours on major structura l
inspections before reaching a basic interval 01'10.000 man hours tor the first
heavy inspect ions o f this airplane. Under traditional maintenance policies. it took
more than ~ million man hours to arri ve at the same structura l inspection interval
lor the smaller and less complex Douglas DC-S. Cost reductions of this
magnitud e are of obv ious impo rtance to any organ ization responsible for
mainta ining large fleets of comp lex equipment. Tesdah l and Tomlingson (1998)
stated that the 21" Century will usher in a broader need for equ ipme nt
management. a crad le to grave strategy to preserve equipment functions . avoid the
consequences or a fai lure and ensure the product ive capaci ty of equipment. They
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also asse rted that ReM should be applied to the mini ng industry. It is beneficia l
to apply ReM to other industries such as meHVAC industry to minimize cost.
increase availability and improve environmen tal conditions.
2.2.6 Math rm at ieal Aspects of Reliabil ity-cent er ed Mainl r na nee
There are three main mathemat ica l :l.SiX"CISofReli ubility-Cernered
Main tenance discussed by H.L. ResnikotT l I978). The first corresponds10 the
partitioning of the system into sets of items that are functionally related by means
of the conseq uences o f their failure. The second is the formal express ion o f the
costs o f maintenance and consequences of failure in com mon terms of direct and
imputed costs. The principal purpose o f me maintenance policy designer is 10
minimize the mainte nance/failure cost function. The third mathematical aspec t
moods the iterative procedure used in the Reliab ility-Centered Maintenance
program to minimize me tOlaIcost function .
2.2.7 Combining Tota l Prod uctive :\l a intena nce and ReM
Toral Productive Maintenance (TPM) was developed in Japan and is a
strategy for improving productivity through improved maintenance and related
pract ices. r PM calls for: restoring equipme nt to a like-new condition. operator
involvement in maintaining equipme nt. improving maintenan ce efficiency and
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effecti veness. lraining people to improve thei r job skills. equipment mana gem ent
and mai ntenan ce prevent ion, and the effective use of preventive and pred ictive
main tenance rechoo logy . Moore and Ram (19991 poin ted out that a comb ination
ofTPM.and Re M efforts has lead 10an improved process for facilitating
team work betwee n the main tenance and prod uction functions . to improved
eq uipmen t relia bilit y and uptime. and to lower opera ting costs.
2.2.8 Maintenance Manage ment . A New Parad igm
Vloubray tn .d .) summarized fifteen ofthe most important areas o f chan ges
whic h have occu rred in the fle ld ofphysic al asse t mana geme nt over the past
fiftee n years in his paper named Maintenance \-Ianage mem . A New Parad igm .
The old and the new paradigms are compared in the follo wing table:
T.. b te 2.2 C omp:u uon or O ld ao d New Parad i IDS (artn \ lo ubr.l\")
M axim O ld Par..di cm New Paradigm
M ax im I: Maintenance is abo ut Main tenance is about prese rvin g
preserving phys ical assets . the functio n of assets .
Maxim 1: Routine maintenance is abo ut Rou ting Maintenance is abou t
prevent ing failures . avo iding, reducing , or eliminating
the consequences of fai lure .
Maxim 3: The primary object ive of the Maintenance affects al l aspe cts of
maintenance funct ion is to busin ess effec tiveness and risk -
opt imize plant availability at safe ty. enviro nmental inte gri ty.
minimum cost. energy efficien cy, product quali ty
and custome r serv ice, not j ust
plan t avai lability and cost .
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Maxim Old Pa ndigm New r andigm
Mu im4: Most equipment becomes more Most failures are not more likely
likely 10 fail as it gets older. to occur as equ ipment gets older .
Maxim 5: Com preberaive data abo ut Decisions abou t the management
failure rates must hi: available of equ ipment failures will nearly
before it is poss ible 10 develo p always have to be made with
3. really success ful maintenance inadequate hard data about failure
program. rates.
Max im 6: There are three basic types o f Thereare four bas ic types of
main tenance : predictive, maintenance : pred ictive,
preventive. and corrective. preventive, corrective. detecti ve .
Maxi m 7: The frequency o f cond ition- The frequency ofcondit ion-based
bused maintenance tasks maintenance tasks sho uld be
should be bused on the based on the fai lure period (a lso
frequency o ttbe failure and/or known as the "lead time to
failure the criticality ortbe failucc" or "P-Finterval"
item .
Maxim S: If both are technically If both are technically
appropriate. fixed interval appropriate. condition-based
cv ema ulszreplacements are maintenance is nearly alwa ys
usualjy both cheape r and more both cheaper andmore effectiv e
effective rban condit ion-based thantlxed interval overha uls I
maintenance. replacements throughout the life
of the asset,
Mnim 9: Serio us incidenlS I catastro phic To a considerable exte nt, the
accidents which involve likelihood of a multiple failure is
multiple equipment failures are a matl3geab le variable . especiall y
usually the result of - bad IlJCk.~ in protected systems.
or "acts of God", andare hence
unmana geable.
Ma lim 10: The quickest and surest way to II is nl:arIy always more cost-
improve the performanc e ofan eff ective to try to improve the
exi sting "unreliab le't asset is to performanc e ofan unreliab le
upgrade the design. asset by improv ing the way it is
operated and maintained, and
only to review the design if this
cannot delive r the required
performance.
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Maxim OldPandigm New Pandicm
Mu im ll : Gene ric maintenance policies Generic polici es should o nly be
can be deve loped for most applied to identical assets whose
types o f physical asse t. operating co ntext. functions and
des ired standards of perfonnance
arc also identical .
Mu im 12: Maintenance policies should be Main tenance policies should be
formulated by manage rs and formula ted by the people clo sest
maintenanc e schedules drawn [0 the assets . The role of
up by suita bly qualifie d managemen t is to provide the
specialists or externa l too ts [0 help them make the right
contractors (a top-down dec isions . and to ensure lhat the
approach). dec isions are sens ible and
defensible.
Muim l3 : The maintenance departmen t A success ful. lasting maintenanc e
on its own can develop a program can o nly bedeveloped
success ful. lasting maintenan ce by maintainers and users of the
program. assets working together.
Muim14: Equipment manufacturersare Equipment manufacturers can
in th~ best position to develo p c nly playa limited (but still
mainten ance programs for new imponant) role in deve loping
physical assets . maintenance programs for new
assets.
Maxim 15: It is possib le to find a quick. Maintenance pro blems are best
one-shot solu tion to all our solved in two stages : I) change
maintenance effectiveness the way people think.2) get them
problems . to apply their changed tho ught
processes 10 technical I process
problems. one step at a time .
2.3 Fault T ree Analysis (ITA)
A Fault tree is a graphical representation of causa l relatio ns obtained when a
system hazardis traced backw ard to search for its possible causes. Faul t tree analysis was
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developed by HA Watson of Bell Telephone laborat ories in 1961- 62 during an Air
Force study contract for the Minuteman Launch Control System. The first published
paper concerning Fault Tree was published by Haas! (1965) at the 1965Safety
Symposium sponsored by the University of Washinit-ton and th.: Boeing Company.
l ambert (1973) described Systems Safety Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis. Fussell
( I976Jdeclared the value of a fault tree to be as follows:
Directing the analysis 10 ferret out failures.
Pointing OUI the aspects of the system important 10 the failure of
interest.
Providing a graphical aid in gi,"ing visibility to those in systems
management who are removed from systems design changes.
Providing options for qualitative and quamuative systems
reliability analysis.
Allowing the analyst to concentrate on one particular system failure
at a time.
Providing an insight into system behavior.
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Detail fault tree construc tion can be round in Henley and Kurnano to ( 1992). The
applic ation of fault tree analysis is described in more detail in Chapter 4.
2.4 Root Cause fai lure Analysis (RCFA)
Root Cause Fai lure Analysis is a sim ple discipline process used 10 investigate.
rectify and elimina te equ ipme nt failure. Lat ino ( 1998) stated that indus try stati stics sho\\
that app roximately $60 bill io n (U S) is spent annually on industrial train ing. Many firm s
arc involved and competent in providi ng trainin g in the area o f Root Cause Failure
Analysis. However. sta tist ics show that onl y about 10% ofthe people trainedever utilize
their new learnin g in the field .
Also Latino ( 1998) discussed the perso nality traits required lo r the individual
chosen to train and lead RCF:\. . The RCFA method is a me3J\510accurately determ ine
the root causes o f an undesira ble event. The process cons ists o f prese n..ing failure data.
ordering the analysis ream. anal yzing the data. commu nicating tindings and
recommendations. and tracking tor bottom-line results. He also stressed that true 'Root
Cause" Failure Analysis ,v'ill identify not only the physical causes of failure. but also the
flawed huma n decis ions that lead to errors of omission and errors o f commiss ion. such as
tluwed procedures. tra ining sys tems and purchasing system.
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Latino (1998) states that RCM cou pled with RCFA covers all the basics in moving
towards tota l Failure Avoidance . RCM may benecessary to gain control otan operation,
howe ver. it is time consuming and expensi ve up front. RC~t' s returns are not real ized
quickly.
RCFA is applied in real time. It deals with today's problems andeliminates them
from being tomorrow's pro blems. Bottom-line results can be immediate if
rccomr nendutic ns are acted on quic kly. RCFA can beproactive when accepted chronic
failures that com prise the mainten ance budget arc climimued from recurring.
2.5 Expe rt Systems
An expert sys tem is an intelligen t comp uter program . h is a highly specialized
piece o r sonwarc that attempts to mimic the function o f an expert. or group of expert s. to
solve co mplex problems in a given field (domain) or appl icatio ns. Waterman 119861
provides a good descript ion of expert systems. Details concern ing infere nce engines can
be found in Giarra tano and Riley (199-').
The majo r compo nents in an expert system can be listed as follows:
Knowledge Base : contai ns the fact s. relations hips. and heuristics
abo ut a domain of application. The knowledge base can have many
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formats which can bechose n by system designers. The most
commo n formats are :
productio n rules (IF - THEN rules)
Frames
Semantic Networks
Inference Engine : It conta ins the inference and control strategie s. It
implements a search and pattern -matching opera tion. Basic
Inference mechanisms are :
Forward chaini ng . a searc hing strate gy that starts
from the basic tacrs. and proves additional facts
progress ively . lt works forwa rd to achieve the
desired goa l.
Backward Chaining - a searching strategy that starts
from a hypothesis. and then looks tor facts which
support the hypothesis until the hypothesis is proved
or disproved.
User interface. and
Interface to outside world.
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At present. there are many expert system shells available on the marke t. A shell is
nothing more than an inference engine plus additional user interface routines . Shells
make thedevelo pment of expe rt systems much easier because they save considerable
effo rt in building interfaces. pattern matchers . search algorithm s. modules tor uncerta in
reasoning, explanation facilities. rule/object editors. and tracing and debu gging facilitie s.
Most of the available shells provide both Forward and Backward chaining capabilities.
The procedure in building an expert system is as follows:
Procedure for Building an Expert System
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..... ·"..,.i.d<l~
p""",~~- • .,..ong
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Ffaure 2.3 Procedure fur nuildi n~ an Expert System
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Whit ehead and Roach (1987)dev eloped an expert sys tem based on Causal
Reasoning. In the ir paper. they describe the application o f a model-based dia gnosis 10 a
ree l problem. diagnosis o f tauns in thl: Mark 4:5lower hoist.
In HO IST. a sys tem for hypo thet ical reasonin g. WIF (Wh::l1 IF). mod els the
funct ionali ty o r all the compo nents thereby creating a "causal mode lr c fthe Mark -l5
lowe r hois t. It is co mputer accessible andcan identif y single or multiple components
whose failure could ex plain the given hoi st misbeh aviou r.
The find ings were listed as follows :
A. An ex pert sys tem that reaso ns from first principle s {i.e.• causa l reason ing) and
requ ires a specification of the functional ity o f the device's componen ts 10 diagnose
faults can bedeveloped without the use of a do main ex pert or "sha llow rules".
B. The problems of co nven tional expe rt system s are identified as follows:
First. shallow reasoning is incap able of handlin g unan ticipated
faults .
Seco nd. sig nificant lag lime exists betwee n initial construct ion of a
device and the development of J. con ventional expe rt system for
main tenance .
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Third. devices commonly go through a series of design
modifications. and it is unclear whether a shallow reason ing fault
advisor is still correct after such modification .
Qualita tive physics is the study of the behaviour of the world in inexact terms . It
has been suggested that humans perceive. understand . and generate expectations about
physics otthe world in an imprecise form. WIF is a hypothetical reasoning sys tem that
can be used to model causality . Causality is the study of how to represent what happens as
a result of some action. Qualitative physics and causal reasoning are strongly related .
The ir paper did not include the quantitat ive aspects of functional fa ilure as
required in RCM However. it clearly pointed out the limitation of conventional expert
system.
2.6 Integrated Mathematical and Knowledge-based Sys tem
Feldman. et 0.1 (1992) developed an integrated Mathematical and Knowledge -
based maintenance delivery system which illustrated a practical approach to the
knowledg e acqu isition process. It demonstrated bov..· a knowledge-based system cou ld
become the framework for incorporat ing operation's research and analytical approaches
into designing a decis ion support system. The developed system is used to develop
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appropriate actions tor maintaining smelt pots in a continuous process production facility
at an Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa ) plant.
The findings were listed as follows:
The requirements of the system are easy to use tor production
personnel. The system can be easily modi lied and extended by the
engineering staff and delivered on a PC-compatible personal
computer .
A knowledge-based system and mathematical analysis can be
integrated into a single replacement policy system .
2.7 O ptimization
Barlow and Hunter (1960) described two preventive maintenance policies using
elementary renewal theory 10 obtain optimum policies. Policy I can be defined as :
perform prevent ive maintenance after luhours of continuing operation without fail ure. If
the system tails before tq hours have elapsed. perform maintenance at the time of failure.
Preventive maintenance is then rescheduled. For this policy. it is assumed thai the system
is as good as new alter any type of maintenance or replacement is performed. Policy II is
de fined as: perform preventive maintenance on the system alter it has been operating tor
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a total time. I. hours regardless of the number of intervening failures. It is assumed that
after each failure only minimal repair is made and the SYS11:m failure rate is not disturbed.
The findings wert' listed as follows:
Under certain reasonable restrictions. Policy I and II have unique solutions which
can be computed and their efficiencies (ava i l~b i l ily) compared.
The optimal luand t. lor policy I and 11respectively. depend only on the ratios
TIf, and 1 ft, respectively. where:
T. · the expected lime 10 perform emergency maintenance
T, ~ the expected lime to perform scheduled maintenance
T.. ~ thl:expected time to perfo rm minimal repair
1fT. '" T, and T. > T/ j.1q(Il) . then Policy I is better than Policy II .
1fT , '" T•. and F is Nlj,l.O)ami wo > ~/2:t T/ H •• thc:n policy I is better than Policy
II.
Policy I is most useful in maintaining simple equipment or systems. However.
Policy 1Imay be more applicable for the HVAC system.
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Barlow and Hunter (1960 ) de veloped their policy based on thl: assumptions that
the planni ng horizon is infinite. all failure even ts an: independent, and in case of
preventive maintenance . failures are removed by replacement.
Before any maintenance strategy is consi dered. the patterns of fai lure based on
conditio nal probability of failure against operating age for various components in the
system must be analyzed in detail. This is well explained by Moubray (199 1).
Referring tu Figure 204 . Pattern A is the well-known bathtub curve. It begins with
a high incidence of failure (known as infant morta lity or bum-in) followed by a constant
failure rate. then a wear-out zone. Pattern B shows constant or slowly increasing fail urc
probab ility. ending in wear-ou t zone . Pattern C shows slowly increasing probab ility of
fa ilure. but there is no identifiable wear-out age. Pattern 0 shows low failure probabilil)
\\ hen the item is new or just out 1>1' the shop. then a rapid increase to a constan t level.
while Pattern E shows a consunt probability of failure at all ages / random failure..
Pattern F starts with high infant mortality. which drops eventually to a constant or very
slowly increasing failure probability.
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Studies do ne on civ il aircrafts showed that 4% of the items confo rm to Pattern A.
:!~~. to B. 5% to C. 7% to D. 14% to E and no fewer than b8% to Pattern F. Although
perc en tages in which these patterns occur in airc rarts is not neces saril y the same as in
HVAC industry . there is 00 doubt that as equipmen t grows more co mplex. we wil l see
more and more o f the Patterns E and F because of the increased usage of electron ics
eq uipmen t in the airc ra fts.
The se find ings co ntradict the belief that there is always a connection between
relia bilit y and the operati ng age ofa n item . This beliefled to the idea that the more e tten
an item is ove rhauled. the less likely it is [0 fail. Nowada ys. this is seldo m true. Unles s
there is a dominant age related failure mode. age lim its do little or noth ing to improve the
rel iabi lity of comp lex item s, In fact. sched uled overhauls can actually increase overal l
failure rates by introd ucing infant mortalit y into ctherwi-e stable systems.
Rarnani (19 85) performed an anal ysis of optimum maintenance polices . In this
study. a solution o f the:well -kno ....n age-base d maintenance model is derived using the
semi-Markov appr oach . The eff ects of the model parameters on the results are then
discussed.
The findi ngs an: listed as follo ws:
The semi-Markov approach to rbe classic al age-based maintenance
model is more appealing 10engineers used to the state space
approach than the renewaltheory concepts introduced by Barlo w
and Hunter (1960).
Markov model approach is only good for non-deter iorating systems
where the lime to failure of t~ system is exponentially d istributed.
This method cannot be usedto determine optimum policies.
Semi-Marko v model can beus<J to handle a class o f stochas tic
systems with non-exponential distribu tions.
The optimum policy is independent o f the probability distributions
of the repair and maintenance times - only the mean durations are
cf imerest.
Ifth e h<1Z3J'd rate is consum or decreas ing. there is no optimum
solution because the unit either is unchanged or improves with
time. Replacing an unfailed unit with a new unit is not e ffi cien t.
This is very similar to the assert ion in Patterns E and F of fa ilure
based on conditional probability of failure.
Theoptim um maintenance interval is a function of ratio ((mJ
mean time to perform the repair ) I ( (m~ mean time to perform
mainte nance ). and not the actual values of mR and rn,.. .
The Semi- Markov mod el wasdiscussed with the following stated ass um ptions:
When not under preventive maintenance. the sys tem is assumed [0
be in one o f two slates : worki ng or failed .
Thai afte r preven tive maintenance or atter a repair following. a
failure, the sys tem returns to as good as new cond itions.
Time is reset to zero . when the sys tem is returned to serv ice after
maintenance or repair.
That the system returns to as good as new cond itions is ne t a very good
assumption and will increase the probabili ty o f failure if the failure pattern belongs to
Panem A and Pattern F.
The literatu re review on expe rt sys tem in RC~' I for aircraft syste ms has provid ed
detailed knowle dge which can begene ralized and ap plied to other large systems such as
HVAC systems . In the followi ng cha pter. the ap plicat ion of RCM to HVAC syste ms wi ll
be discussed.
Chapter 3 Application of RCM
This chap ter desc ribes lh~ eight steps tor imple men ting ReM to HVAC systems
(s~ Figure 3. 1). The ReM method reviews eac h asset in its operating context by asking
the fol lowi ng questions :
{I) What are the functions and associated performance standards of the asset
in its present operat ing context?
t ~) In what ways does it tai l to fulfil its func tions'!
(31 What causes each functional failure"
(~I \ \ bat happens when each failure occurs '!
(5) In what way does each failure matter ?
(6 ) What can bedone to prevent each failure"
(7) What if a suitable preventive task cannot be found'!
Tesduhl and Tomlingson (1991) describe 8 logical SIC::pS tor implementing ReM .
These steps are shown in Figure 3.1. The application of these steps to a com ponent of the
I-I VAC syste m is described as follows:
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Figure 3.1 Implemennng RC~t in Eight Lo~iI: ;I1 Sleps (afierTesdabi &
Tomlingson. 1997)
The implementation steps include:
1. Select the Most Critical Equipment - l et's assume that the most critical
equipment in a pan icular HVAC operation is tho: fresh air intake louver.
Identify me Functions ctthe Most Critical Equjpment > What. exactly does
the fresh air intake louver do in its operating context? The primary
functions of the fresh air intake louver can bestated as follows:
to allow adequate fresh air intake to the HVAC system.
to stop snow and ruin from getting into the HVAC
equipment.
to provide aesthetics for the building architecture.
10 keep unwanted people or animals from the HVAC
system.
3. Establish Performance Standards- How well must the fresh air intake
louver perform in the conditions under which it operates? The lou..'er must
be able to. for example:
Allow 5.000 litre/sec of quality fresh air to the HVAC
sys tem with maximum pressure drop of 2.5 mm during all
weather conditions tor periods of 24 hours. stopping only
lor system shut down.
-I.. Determine the Types of Failures - Any equipment condition that does not
permit the fresh air louver to meetthe performance standard would
constitute a failure. A potential failure is an identifiable physical condition
which indicates that the fai lure process has stand . For fresh air intake
louver. typical potentia l failures might be:
The louver tails to allow adequate fresh air intake.
The [auvel' fa iled to stop snow and rain from entering
HVAC system.
If the louver is damaged. it destroys the building
aesthetically.
The louver tails to stop birds. insects. rats and intruders
Hum entering the HV.-\C system.
A functional failure is the inability to meet the specified
performanc e standard . A fresh air intake louver experie ncing the
fol lowing types of failures wou ld not be:able to meet its performance
standards and would sustain a functional failure:
A. Blocka ge by foreign material in the surface ofthe louver.
B. Blades o f the louver dama ged.
C. Louver damag ed.
D. Lou ver removed.
Also. we must beaware of hidden failures in wh ich the failure is
nor upparen r until the function is attemp ted by the operator . However.
there is no hidden failure lo r 11Kfresh air intake louver.
5. Enumerate the Consequences o f Failures • What will the resul t bei f a
speci fic failure occ urs'? Consequences of fa ilure can range from
inconvenience to catastrophi c. For example. func tional failure A is caused
by foreign matter blockage in the surface o ft he louver. This will cause a
reduction in air supply to the HVAC system. Th is causes high static
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pressure for the fan and consum es more elec trical energy, The funct ional
failure B is caused by physical damag~ to the louver . Th is \...i ll cause air
wh ich is wener thannormal to the fresh air dam per. Th is will cause pee-
fi lter to besaturat ed with moisture. 10 sag. andto tai l. Also excess wet
cold air and snow will cause:the free ze protect ion de vice 10beact iva ted
and shut down the system. The funct ion failure C is caused by physical
damage or louver falls out of place. The function failure 0 is caused by
physica l damage or louve r physically removed from its place. Th is will
destroy the building aesthetically. This wi ll provide a path to r burglars and
je opardize public safety. The unwanted foreign material can damage tiller
and fans.
This type ofdescription lends itse lf 10 a more syst ematic tab le and
the above information is put into a table form as shown in Table 3.1.
In the larger contex t. we must consi de r that maintenance can atfec t
all phases o f the HVAC system operat ion. Typically. without reliab le
eq uipment. qu.:tlity building environ ment targe ts cannot be met.
It follows that without depend able eq uipmen t. air qualit y in tenu s
o f temperature. humidi ty. and fresh air supply are co mpromised. and
building:occu pancy satisfact ion is difficu lt to attain. Also. unre liable
50
equip ment can endanger personnel. create environmenta l hazards and
undermine energy efficiency . For all ofth ese reasons. avoidance of the
consequences of failure: mustbea primal)' maintenance objective.
51
i-
6. Rankthe Consequences of Failures - Because equipment has
increased in complexity. the number of ways it can fail have
multiplied, Therefore. consequences of fail ure must be classified to
guide us in taking preventive and correcti ve act ions, For example:
Sati: t~ ' failures endanger person nel as well as equipment
Ope ratlcnal failur es result in product loss (in terms of air
quality and poor building environment) plus the cost o r
repair
Ncn -cperancoat failures fCSUIt only in the cost of repair
In any industry. the most important aspects an: the avoidance or
reduction of the consequences of sali:IYand uperatic nal failures. Therefore.
tho:most competent types otpreventice and corrective techniques are
applied to the equipment most critical to the safe ty of individuals and the
production process ,
7. Apply the Most Effective Cond ition Monitoring Techniques - To
detect potentia l fa ilures early and accurately distinguish them from
normal operating conditions . condition monitoring techniques such
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as vibration analysis are used. They are capable of detecting
deteriorating equipment conditio ns with much greate r accuracy and
reliabilit y than human beings. These techniques also detec t hidden
failures that human beings would not beable to detect unless they
tried a control mechanism and it did not respond. With the
availability of more effective and reliable condition monitoring
techniques. equipment condition can be more accuratel y monitored.
This allows a unit to remain in service providing that it cont inues to
meet its performance standard rather than replacing the component
at the ti rst sign ofpore ntial failure. ln turn. this approach yield s
significantly greater life from compon ents and units.
The sale physical location of the louver is of critical importance.
This can best be achieved by establishing a moni toring program by video
camera over a suitable period of time to ensure that no dangerous fumes
from automobile exhaust etc. are in the area. Also suitable gas sensors
shou ld be installed in the appropriate locations.
H. Establish an Overall Maintenance Plan - Based on the
consequences of failures. a maintenance program featuring
condition monitoring technique s is applied to identi fy potential
fa ilures accura tely and quickly to preclude their deterio ration to
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functional failure levels. The most effec tive maintenance program
is built on the preced ing implementation steps:
Critical equipment is ident ified
Fresh air intake louver (unctions are determined
Performance standards are established fo r the fresh
airin take louver
Types of failures arc identified. component by
component
The consequen ces of failures arcdetermined lor
each failure
Failure consequences an: ranked to give priority to
preventive act ions
The best. most applicable condition monitoring.
techniques are identified .
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Then. the conditio n mc nitc ring techniques selected are fitted into
existing. competen t maintenance program s 10 protect the fresh air intake
louver from functio nal fai lures and their consequences.
The failure modes as identified in the Re M information worksheet Tab le 3.1 are
then used as an input to the fault tree ana lysis as shown in Fault T ree Analysis Figure 4 .1-
in Ch ap ter 4.
The above approach can begeneralized and applied to any system under study.
Once the system scope is defined l1I1d major components are listed . RCM techniques can
be US<.'\110identi Iy the intended functions of all compo nents. The causes of failure and
th..' cffe'c-ts o f failure are then tabled in the RCM lnfcrma ticn workshee t. This approach
can be applied 10 the central HVAC unit wi th configuration shown in Figure 3.:! with tbe
results shO\\TIin RCM informatio n workshee t, Tab le 3.1. Table A-3.lI0 A-3.13.
Informa tion concerning relal ionship between multiple failures is listed in the: fault tree
ana lysis Figure B-U to B-U9.
Since the ReM worksheet is intended to illustrate general application. there is nil
specified quantity in terms o f air flow. static pressure or noise level. In a spec ific
application. rbe stated variable must bequantifi ed l1I1d sensitivity analysis must be
addressed. The failure modes obtained from ReM analysis will provide required input
into the expert system as discussed in Chapter 6,
II
Figure 3.2 Air Handlin g System \\ 'ilhoul Return Air
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Chapter 4 Application of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
A fault tree is a graphical representationof causal relations obtained when a
system hazard is traced backward to search tor its possible causes . The system hazard is
then the rep event of the fault tree. There are two type of building blocks used to build
fault tree. namely gale symbols and event symbo ls. The app lication of gale symbol s
described by Henley and Kumamoto (1992) is listed as follows:
Gale symbols connect e vents according to their causal relations. The symbols lor
the gates are listed in Table 4. i. A gale may have one or more input events but only one
output event.
The output events of AND gatesoccur if all inputeventsoccur simultaneously.
On the other hand. the output events of OR gates happen if any one ofthe input events
occurs. The causal relation expressed by an AND gate or OR gate is deterministic
because the occurrence of the output event is completely controlled by the input events.
There are causal relations that are not deterministic but probabilistic and represented by a
hexagon called inhibit gate. For detail explanations of Priority AND gate. Exclusive OR
gatc. and m out of n gate see Table 4.1. The structure of a tree is shown in Figure 4.1.
Gate Symbol Gate Name Causa l Relation
A Output event occur s if all input eventsI AND gate occu r simuhaneous ly.
L,---r
0 Output event occurs if anyone of the input2 OR gate events occurs.
I
3 Inhibit gate Input produces outp ut when cond itional
eVenIOCCUf'S.
4 Priority AND Output event occurs if all input events
gate occur in the order from left to right.
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5 0Exclusive Ok Output event occurs if one. but not both. ofgate the input events occur.
m out of n gate Output event occurs if m out of n input
6 m {voting or events occur.
sample gate)
ninpuls
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I
System fai lure or accident
I(the top event)
I
The fault tree consists of sequences of
events that lead to the system failure
or accident.
I
The sequences of events are built by
AND , OR , or other logic gates
I
The events above the gates and all events
that have a more basic cause are denoted by
rectangles with
I i
the event described in the rectang le.
I
The sequences finally lead to a basic cause
for which there is failure rate data available
The basic causes are denoted by circles and
represent
0
the limit of resolution of the fault tree .
Fun damental structure of a
fau lt tree
6 1
This proced ure starts with an initiating event and finds the comb ination of failure s
wh ich cause it (backward logic) . Using this method and applied to the fresh air intake
louver failure as a top event . the fault tree can be constru cted as foll ows:
A. Place fresh air intake louver failure as top event by plac ing this inside a
rectang le. which is represented by a gate
B. The causes of fresh air intake louver failure are either louver being blocke d
by foreign matter or louverdam aged/removed. the inpu t event s.
Therefo re. an OR gale is used to represent "fresh air intake louver fai lure",
an output event occu rs ifany one of the input events occurs .
This type of analysi s lends itse lf to a graph ical procedure into which coded
information is put in a tigure as shown in Figure 4.2. In the figur e. the reliabil ity R(t ) for
the Fresh Air Intake Louver is modelled as follows:
Rm FAIL
where,
R(t )FAILOl -R (tlF AIL02-R(t JFAIL03 15.5)
R(I) FAll
R(l lFAiLO I
R(tIFAI L02
R(tlF A IL03
reliabi lity for the fresh air louver
reliabilit y of louver not blocked by foreign
reliability of lou ver
reliab ility o f louver stay intact
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Fresh Air Intake Louver Failure
(FAIL)
~
R(t) for Fresh Air Intake louv er = R{t)FAl101 x R(t)FAl102 x R(t)FAILOJ
Notes: FAIL01 to FAILOJare information coded using failure modes from ReM worksheet
Figure -1.2 Fresh Air Intake Lou ve r Failure
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This is a well accepted technique and appropriate for finding failure relationships.
Howeve r. large fault trees are difficu lt to understand. bear no resembl ance to system now
sheer. and are not mathematical ly unique. This techn ique as applied 10 various
components of the ce ntral HVAC system with configuration in Figure 3.2 is shown in
fault tree analysis Figure 8 -4.2 to B-4.19 in Appendix B.
Latino l l<)l.)l:! ) explains that in most failures there an: actually three layers. Firstly.
there is the physical component. secondly there is the human error. and finally the latent
root of the problem . which is the management system weakness. In many cases. this is
the true cause of the problem . If this is app lied to the fresh air intake louver failu re and it
is found that there is actual blockage by foreign material (physical component). the
problem may be traced back 10 garbage bins located ncar the fresh air intake louver. an act
of human error. This also identities a management system weakness. The surroundings
around the fresh air intake louver must becontrolled to ensure no garbage bins. no
garbage truck loading. or car exhaus t that will pollute the quality ofair intake and affect
the performance of the louver.
Fault Trees provide a good visual picture tor all technical personnel.
dearly showing:the causes of a particular failure. It provides a clear . concise visual
outline of individualfailures in a sub-system.
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Cha pter 5 Math emalical Model and Optimi zation
This chapter outlines detailed mathematical mood s required 10 quantify
component and system reliabiliiies. which are built on the results from the two previous
chapters . In Chapter 3. the application o( RCM obtains Ih (' intended functions. causes of
functional failure and the effect of failures. The results uf thisapplication show 3-
qualitative model. In Chapter 4. Fault Tree analysis is used to discuss how acqu ired
knowledge (rom ReM can beanalyzed in order to understand the interrelation of
functional fa ilures that will result in compo nent failures .
5.1 Network Mode lling Concepts
In practice. a system is frequently represented as a network in which the system
components are connected together either in series. parallel. or complex. which is a
combinat ion ofseries and parallel. This is well developed by Billimon and Allan ( 1992).
5.1.1 Series Systems
The components in a set are said to be in series from a rel iability poin t of
view i f they must al l work for system success or only one needs to fail tor sys tem
failure.
(5.1)
If there are n com ponents in series. the generalized formulae are:
R.. is the probabi lity of sys tem success or reliability
R, is the indiv idua l com ponent reliability
(5.2)
Q, the unreliability or probability of system failure
5.1.2 Parallel Systems
The co mponents in a set are said to be in parallel from the reliab ility point
of view if only one needs to beworking for system success or all mus t ta il tor
system failure as shewn below.
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(5.3)
R,. is the pro bability of sys tem succes s or relia bili ty
Q. is the unreliability or probab ility of component failure
Q,·n:Q,
Q~ is the unreliabilit y or probabilit y of sys tem failure
5.1.3 Complex Systems
(S,4)
Xcne of the co mpo nents are conn ected in a simple series/paral le l
arrangement. The mathematical model tor a com plex syste m is a co mplicated
application IJ( series and parallel moJdlin~ based on the ph~ sica ! situation.
5.2 Ma thema tica l Model for Components
Detail mathematical models for rd iab ilil:- R(I) for some key components
in the HVA C system can be modeled based on the failure mod es as shown in the
Fault Tree analysis ligures in Appendix B and ilk di:iCUSSOO as follows:
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5.2.. Model for Fresh Air Intake l ouver
The fresh air intake louver failure can be caused by a louver bloc ked by
foreign matter (FAILOI). a broken louver (FA ILU2) and a damaged lo uver or ifit
is remov ed (FAILO))
RIOFAL R(t)FAILO1+R(IIFAIL02+R(t)FAIL03 15.51
R(tl FAL
R(t)FA ILOI
R(tl FA IL02
R(t)FA IL03
rel iabil ity for the fresh air louver
reliab ility of louver no! blocked by foreign
relia bility of louver
reliability of louver stay intact
5.2.2 Model for Fresh Air Damper Failure
\ Iost o f the damper failures are ca used b~ corro sion which is ca used by the
ocean air chem istry . This effect is directly propo rtional to the distance from ocean
10 the damper and inversely proportio nal to time and rain fal l intens ity.
R(IJ FAD = kD /[n + (AYRF +c)J
where.
(5.6)
R(t) fAD reliabilit y to r the fresh air damper
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D distance from thesea in meier
time in years
AYRF average ~ e3fly rainfall in rom
c
5.2.3 Model for Air.Filter Failur e
The air filter failure mode is a function of intake air velocity. location and
type of air intake louver. the:rainfall inh:nsity and the direction of the wind.
Frequen tly. architectural conside rations d ictate the type and style o flcuve r. High.
ctficiency. lew-pressure louvers that effectively limit carryover of rain are
available. ColJ regions may require c snow baffle to direct fine snow pan icles to
a low-velocity area below the dampers.
Rm AF
R(t) AF
R(t)AFI
Rltl AFL
R(t) FRAME
Rltl .-\ F! · Rlll AFl · Rm FR.-\~IE tS.,)
rdiabilily for air tiller
reliability for air filter based on inlet
condition which C3Uk' tifter III sag
reliability fo r air filter based on usag~
reliability lor air tiller frame
instal lation
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The reliability for the air filter will be lower on windy and rainy days. R(I)
AF I will be equal to one on sunny days without snow or rain because the filter will
not be sa turated with moisture and sagged.
5.2 .~ Model for Freeze Protection Failure
The following mode s that cause freeze protection failures are identified:
no power to heating circulating pump :
direct coupling betwee n moto r and pump shaft:
pump impeJlor :
low supply hot water heating temperature:
draft space between heating coils.
Base d on the above findings. the reliability of the freeze protection can be
madded as follows :
Rlt) CFP
where.
R{l) CFP
R(t6) DC
R(t7) PIMP
R(t6 )DC • R(t7) PIMp· R(t8 ) HWHT (5.8)
reliabilit y for coil freeze protectio n
system
reliability for hea ting pump direc t
coupling
reliability lor heating pump impeller
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R(18) HWHT reliability for hot water healing
temperature
16.17 and t8 are time dependi ng upon usage alter the component is
installed III repaired ,
The electrical failure tor the pump is being ignored in this study and tho:
draft space between heating coils is a construction problem and can beminimized
by des ign. This failure can only occur when outdoor temperature is below tr'C.
5.2.5 Model for Fan Failure
After six years of monitoring fans for a number of buildings at the
~kmori<l l Cni\'~iIY ofNewtoundland, it has been noted the tailure otthe
10110\\ing ccrnponems has caused Ian failures:
fan belts ;
Ian vortex vane ;
fan bearing:
Ibn assembly:
tan motor.
Of course . there an: many other possible failure mode s which can exist.
such as impelle r. coupling. shaft and electrical failure. See Air Movement and
11
Contro l Associat ion. Inc. Publication 202·88 Troubleshooting Fan Application
Manual lor details. However. these failure modes seldom happen and are not
included in this study.
Since the fan will fail if any one of the th e failure modes exist. these
fa ilure modes are independent of each other with the exception thai when a
bearing failure occurs the Ian belt usually fa ils at the same lime. There fore. fan
failure can bemodeled as follows:
R(t)FA N R(t l )FB · R(t2)FVV • R(tJ )FBG · R(t4 )FA
• R(tS)FM (5.9)
RmFAN reliability for fan
R(II IF B reliability for Ian belts
R(t~lFVV reliability for tan vortex vane
R(t3) FBG reliability tor fan bearing
Rlt4) FA reliab ility for tan assembly
R/tS) F\-I reliability tor fan motor
II. t1. t3. t-l.cnd tS are time depending upon usage utter the component is
installed or repaired.
Fur tans without vortex vane system we can reassign R(t2 ) FVV to the
value of one. The reliabil ity of Ian belts will be affected by temperature.
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R{uCCS
especially during shut down and stan up conditions. Theseeffec ts will beminimal
i f the system is inoperaricn for 24 hoursperday.
5.2.6 Model for Computer Control Syste m Failure
Most ofthe control system failure is caused by the freeze protection
subsystem. This again is based on the wind velocity. .....ind direction. air intake
velocity, position of the treezescn and the conditions of the fins in the h<:ming
coil. The other failure mode is the failure of the EP (Electric-Pneumatic] relay.
Modelinl: for R<oCCS • Reliability lor the control system is a \-ery
complex process and can bemodeled as follows:
R{tl)CCSFOI .. R(t:!)CCSF02 " R(tJ tCCSFOJ ..
R(I~)CCSF04 " RltSlCCSF05 " R(t6)CCSF06 "
R(17)CCSF07 " R(t8)CCSF08" R{t9jCCSF09(5.101
R{ll )CCSFOI '" reliability for temperature sensor
R( 1)CCSF02 • reliability for temperature input module
RltJICCSF03 .. reliability for temperature output module
R( t~ ICCSF04 '= reliability for humidity sensor
R(t5)CCSFOS • reliability lor humidity input module
R(t6)CCSF06 - reliability for humidity output module
R((7)CCSF07 .. reliability for static pressure sensor
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R{I~)(,CS F08 .. reliability for static pressure input module
RU9JCCSF09 • reliability for static pressUll:output module
II. 12. t3. 14. O. t6. t7. 18and 19an: lime depending upon usageafter Ihe
component is installedor repaired.
I lowever. there will beno need tor freezeprotection if the environment is
not below O"C. Thereliability lor the control system will decrease if the outdoor
temperature is much lower than O"C.
5.2.7 :\Iodcl fo r System Heatin g System fa iled to Heat Supply
Air to Required Temperat ure
Rttl HSF
RIOHSF
R(I)HSFO I
R(t)HSF02
Rtt)HSF03
R(l)HSF04
R(tjHSF05
R(t)HSFOI-R(t IHSF02- R(t)HSF03 " RltjHSF04
-R(t)· HSF05 (5.11)
reliability fer healing: system
reliability tor heating water temperature
reliability tor hot water healing circulating
pump
reliability for tube and tin
reliability tor heating coil
reliability for heating coil control system
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Tho: other failure mode such as outdoo r temperature is too cold is not
included in the modelin g in order to simplify themodel. This failure mode is a
design problem and cannot be solv ed by mainten ance.
5.2.8 Model for Cooling System Failed to Cool Supp ly Air to
Requ ired Te mperature
RllICSF R{t)CSFOI '"R(t)CSF02 '"R(t)CS FQj · R(t)CSF04· R{t
where.
jCSFOS'"R(IICSF06 (S. I2 )
R(llCSF
R(tlCS FOI
R(t)CSF 01
R(t ICSF Oj
Rtt)CSF04
R(t}CSF06
RU)CSF05
reliabi l ity for coo ling system
reliability lor cooling water temperature
reliability to r cooling water circulat ing pump
reliability for tube- tin
reliabilit y for coo ling coil
reliability for coolin g coil cont rol system
reliabil ity 'or ou tdoo r temperature
However. R(tlCSF 05 is not inc luded in the model in order to simplify the
mathemat ical model . This failure mode is a design problem and cannot beso lved
by maintenance.
7;
5.2.9 Model for System Reliability
R(t)S R(t}fAN'" R(t) AF '" R(t)CCS '" R(t)FAD '" R(t)CFP
'" R(t)HSF $ R(I)CSF (5.13)
where.
R(IjS
R(I)FAN
R(t)AF
R(I)CCS
R(t )FAD
R(t)CFP
R(I)HSF
R(I)CSF
reliability tor the system
reliability tor fan
reliability tor air filter
reliability tor the compu ter control sys tem
reliability for fresh air damper
reliability for coil freeze protection system
reliability to r heating system
reliability to r cooling sys tem
5.2.10 limitations of Reliability Predictions
The reliability predictions based on analysis of the best available data is
intended to make reliabilit y prediction as good a tool as possible. However. like
any tool. reliability prediction must be used intell igently. with due consid eration of
its limitations.
The first limitation is that the failure Me models are point estimates whic h
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are based on available data. Theyare valid for the conditions under which the
data was obtained and for the components covered. Even when used in similar
environments. the differences between system applications can besignificant.
Failure rules are also impacted by operational scenarios. operator characteristics.
maint enance practices and the definition of failu re.
5.3 Weibull Analysis
Sinha (1')86) states that lor items that are Iikdy to fail at any time. it is quite
customary to assume that thelif e of the item is a random variable with a distribution
function F(t). which is tho:probability that the item fails before time t.
There are many distributions such as exponential. normal. leg-Normal. Gamma
and Weibull used lor reliability data analysis. The Wcibull distribution is usc>Jin Ihis
study because:it is the distribution widely accepted lor failure analysis. Henleyand
Kumanoto t 19921 states that among all the distributions available for reliability
calculation. the Weibull distribution is regarded as unique to the field. Detailed
information concerning Weibull Analysis can be found in Abernethy (1998).
Equipment Failure
The data lor equipment failure is limited because not many equipment suppliers
arc willing to release this. Despite years of failure data collected by Honeywell Inc.•
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speci fically tor the buildings under this study . there is still limite d meani ngful data . A
Weibull ana lysis is used10 perform the actua l calcul ation to determine F(tHthe failure
dist ribu tion) lor failure mode because it can beused 10 pro vide reasonably accurate fa ilure
ana lysis and failure forecasts .....i.th extremely small samp les.
Bask form ulae lo r Weib ull cumula tive distribution function (C DF) has an exp licit
equa tion
p( n t)
whe re.
(5. 14 )
(5.15)
p(nt)
F(I )
probability thai the item su rvives lor atleast time t
failu re disuiburic n e I-R(t)
time
cha racteristic life or scale param eter in time unit
stope or shape paramet er
2.1 1828 1828. the basefor natura l logari thms
T a random variab le
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Estimation of Paea me tera
There are many methods o f est imating the parameters of the Weibut l distribution.
vterhc ds include maximum likelihood. method o f moments . and least squar~s. Perhaps
the easies t 10 usc in this case is the least squares method.
Equat ion (5. L.a) can be transformed as fo llows:
Inln ( I I I · F(l» =
t'V •
I- F(t)
lr ul - F(t»
In{IJ(I· FU))
~l nlll -13ln{ ll )
(5.16)
(5. 17)
(5. ltll
(5 .19)
This is an equation for a straigh t line in the form of:
I~x'" c
where.
InU)
- Pln(q)
slope of the line
C y-intercept
(S.20)
lnlll) .c , p
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(S.21)
(S.22 )
Detailed resu lts obtained from raw data for various component failures for the
HVAC syste m (sho wn in Appe ndix C) are discussed as follows:
For exam ple in Table C·S.II RankTable Fan Motor Failure
Ar13lysis in Append ix C. raw data (in hours) is obtained from
fail ure reco rd. The equipment ran 10 an actual failure is recorded
as X·value in the table and ~I'\'~ as input to a commerc ial
package. Supe r SMITH . a leading Weibu ll analy sis software
including many options: Weibull. weibuyes. Normal. Log Normal
data analysis and plotting with chi-Square. Poisson. Binomial
probability calculations. failure forecasting. optimal pans
replacement and Monte Carlo confidence bounds .
However. ifthe equipment did nOI fai l and wassuspe nded. a negative value is
placed in front to distin guish the d ifference. This program will thc:ncalcul ate '1and p. the
1\\0 important param eters for wetbcttAnalysis . An occurrence CD F graph can then be
generated as Sh0 \\11 in Figure C·S.6. Th is graph can hi: used to predict the relationship o f
FlO and the time used in operation. Aller '1 and P have beengenerated. it can then be
used 10 predic t F(t) and R(t) at specific hours ofoperation. This output is show n in Table
C·S. I:!.
For exam ple. a tan failure can bemode led as
R(t ) Fan '" R(tO FB • R{t2) FVV • R(tJ ) FBG • Rlt"') FA • R.l. t5 ) FM (5.23)
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whe re.
R(II ) FB coo be obtained from Ta ble C-;A and Fig ure C.5 .2
R(12) FVV coo be obtai ned from Tab le C- 5.6 and Figure C-;.)
R(tJ ) FBG can beobtained (rom Ta ble C-; .Sand Figure C-5...1
R(t.j.) FA can beobtained from Table C-5.1Oand Figure C-; .;
R(15) FM can be obtained from Tab le C-5 .12 and Figure C·5 .6
Then Ril l FAN can becalculated. An example us ing the same time for II 10 t5 is
sho wn in Table C-5.13.
5.-4 O pti mization - Ava ila bility
The bas ic assumptions arc: the planning horizon is infinite . all failure events are
inde pend ent and in the case of prevent hie maint enanc e. fa ilures are remc ....ed by
replacement or repai r. The syste m under study . when not under maintenance. is assum ed
to be: in one of two stales : work ing or fai led. It is ass um ed tha I after preventive
main tenan ce or utter a repair foll owing a failure . the system returns 10 "as good as 0<.'\ \ '-
co ndition . i.e.. lime is reset to zero , when the system returns to servi ce alter ma intenance
or repair .
The ava ilab il ity A(T) (availability) is the percentage o f working period ofa piece
o f'equiprnent e ver a certai n period. For exam ple. over a period 01'365 days . if a certain
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piece o f equipme nt is working 330 days; is under ma intenance for 20 days and is under
emergency repair lor 15 days. Then the ava ilability A(T) is
In general. the avai labi lity of the system is given by:
working time
rime used tor repair .. time used far maintenance
0,
(S.HI
m, mean time 10 per form the repair
m \l mean time to perform maintenan ce
R(t l reliablliry densi ty
ttt ) faIlure density
R(TJ reliability > I· F(T)
FIT) failure distribution
The mean lime to repair includes time to:
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Find me person whocan repair the fault.
Diagnose the fault.
Repair the bull.
Revalidate or test me machine.
Equa tion 5.24 shows that lhe Availability. A(T). o f a sys tem depends on ot her
var iables besides the rdi abililY. One expects intuilivd }' that. the steady-state ava ilability
will increase as the Reliability. R(l). increases. However as the above equa tion shows. the
re lationship between A(T) and R(t) is not linear. The steady state availabil ity also
depe nds on the repai r and maintenance times (m Rand m \IJand the failure dis tributi on .
F(T). Decreasing either o f these will also increase the availability .
Th is analys is illus trates lhat no matter how reliable a system is. its availabi lity to
perform its funct ion can be intlu enced dramatically by factors outside its desig n. and these
are the areas of concern for operati on and maintenance . The availa bililY will depend on
the stability 01" all these factors .
The unavail abilit ies due to repair and preventive mainten ance respec tively are
given by:
tS.2!ii)
8J
m.l,-R(D
(5.26 )
The optimum maintenance interval 1"1 opt can thus beobtained by equati ng the
dcnvau ve of A(T) with respect 10 1 to zero and is givcn by the solut ion of the integrul
equation
where.
rh(n ' IR( l)"I - F(7),,~
II "' /I -lII lj
hIt) is the (hazard function ) associated with F(I)
(5.27)
Some properties ofthe optimal solution for maximizing the availability include:
lfthere is no solution to the equation. 1 opt » infinity. Thai is.
preventive:maintenance is not efficient and no maintenance should
be performed.
1. If the hazard rate is constant or decreasing , there is no solution to
equatio n. i.e.• 1 opt = infinite . If the unit is unchanged or improves
with lime. replacing an unfailed unit with a new unit is not
efficient.
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3. (rn,/m.,J > I is a necessary condi tion for a so lution to exi st. i.e.. lor
preventi ve maintenance 10 beeffective. The re is no point in
preventive maintenance ifit takes longer than a repair . when both
the operations bring the unit to the:same (as good as new ) condition
Other optimum maintenance mod els wilh similar so lutions
..I. Minimizing the cos t rate
As shown by Barlow and Huntert19601. if one wishes to minimize the cost
rare. i.e. the cost per unit o f operating oftime which is give n by the
solution is the same as the eq uation with the mean durat ions mk and 01 \1
being replaced by the costs CRand C\I respectively.
(' In" Cll ' R~I "CR'Rn
[ R(I)Jl
where.
(S.28)
em •
c.
cost per unu of operating o f lime
cost of maintenance tcost a t a planned replace ment }
cost of repair tcost u fu nplanned failure)
ss
Chapter 6 A Knowledge-Based Decision Support System
This chapter describes the methodology and advantages o f incorporating RC~t
and fau lt If'« ana lys is into 11Kdevel op ment of a database dec isio n su pport sys tem lor
maintenance of system. II also describes how failure data an: used to predic t the risk o f
failure fo r a HVAC syste m based on WeibuJl distribut ion using a data base system as the
shdl lor an expe rt sys tem.
6. 1 Adva ntage s of Incorporating ReM Applica tions into a
Knowledge-Based System Methodol ogy
Co nvention al expert systems have at least three major shortco mings in fault
diagnosis. Firstly. the)' are incapable o f handl ing unantic ipated faults. Seco ndly. the need
uf significant time lag between initial construct ion of a device and the development o f a
conventio nal expert system for mainte nance . Thirdly. devices comm only go through a
series o f des ign mod ifications. and it is unclear whether a shallow reaso ning fault adviso r
is still correct after such modificat ions. Once the system is de fined and its configuration
is put in place . RC \ I shou ld be used to determine the intended funct ions. func tional
failure s and effect lol l"failures. Since ReM techniques use fundamen tal approac hes 10
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specify what functions are required. it is robust andgeneric eno ugh to address the abo ve
problem s. The:operation can beupdated to reflect the:chang e in system design fo r
required functions. Once the system is updated. the C3 USC of failures combe traced back
10 fundamental engi neerin g. In this case. temperature. humid ity. pressure. flow rate and
vibratio n arc the paramet ers in the system used to trace the cause of failu re.
6.2 flow Ca n This Unifica tion Be Achiend?
Co nvernionul expe rt systems auempt to cap ture an expen's opinion. A RC~1
database: suppon system signiticanlly differs from this approach since it does not depend
upon advice . By using RC M. fault tree techniq ues. and a Weibull analysis. this
comb inat ion generates ora quantitative model ofthe system and develops a da tabase
system from first principles. This \ \ill resul t in an expe rt system without an expert in the
classic sense. The use of RC:"1and the fault tree techniques in developing a data base
system will be illust rated in this chap ter using an exam ple. The function. func tiona l
failure (loss o f functio n). fai lure mode (cause cffailure] and failure effect (what happens
when it fails t for the following major compone nts in the HVAC system are stud ied in
detai l as shown in Appendix A. These compone nts arc :
Fresh air intake louver
11 . Fresh air damper
Il l. Pre-filt er
IV. Air filters
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V. Heating coils
VI. f reeze protection system
VII. Cooling coi ls
VIII. Humidifier
IX. Supply fan
X. EP Relays
XI. Control system and sequences of operation
The failure of any component in the system is studied in detail to
determine the effect on energy consumption. air pressure balancing and impact on
air quality. temperature. humidity and indoor air pollutants: and are measured
against American Society of Heating. Refrigerat ion and Air Conditioni ng
Engineers (ASHRAE) Standard. Common design problems were discussed which
substantiated the hypothesis thai some buildings' HVAC systems could be
improved by proper design and commission. This study demonstrates the
importance of integration 1,)1' design. construct ion. commissioning. operation.
maintenance and continuous improvement or modiflcaticn to the system .
6.3 Softwa re Package for the Knowledge-Based Sys tem
A commercia l database program such as "Microsoft Access' has both the
database storage component and the necessary programming integrated to provide
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all the requirem ents for a knowledge-based system. The rapid develo pment of
general commercial database programs with all the linking and retrieving ability
has replaced the need (or a specific expert system. The acceptance of any
commerc ial database program in the industry is much higher than a spec ific expert
system. The refore Microsoft Access is being used as the computing tool.
6." Adding ReM Failure Modes and Fau lt Tre es into the Knowledge--
Based System
The primary data needed to build the expert system is stored in lo ur database
tab les. They are:
problems
symptoms
events
Causes . problems. and symptoms dcubase tables are essentially descri ptive and
are used til code the descriptions for the ope rating environmen t. The fourth datab ase
table combines the data from cau se's. problems. and symptoms and code s the events
which take place in the opera ting environment. The "E vents" table is one branc h o tthe
fault tree. Related data contained in these tables can be queried resulting in various
reports. These tables arc' descri bed as follows:
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6....1 Ca uses
The failure modes. or causes, identified in the RCM table are coded and
stored in the database table as shown in Table 6.1.
Tab le 6.1 Caun IdenlifiC:l!iun
CausCli_IO Cause Oenripl ion
AFFPFOI Rain or Snow in fresh air
.-\ FFPF02 Pre-filter broken
AFFPFo3 Din)' fresh air intake
..\ FFPF~ Air filter medium broken
CSFOI Cooling water temp. is too high
CSF02 Cooling water circulating pump failed
CSF03 Tube and fins covered by din and failed to remove heat
CSF(M Cooling coil ruptured
CSF05 Outdoor temperature is too high
CCSFOI Temperature sensor tailed
CCSF02 Temperature input moduli: failed
CCSF03 Temperature output module faileJ
CCSF~ Humidity sensor failed
CCSF05 Humidity input module failed
CCSF06 Humidity output module failed.
CCSF07 Static pressure sensor tailed
CCSFOS Static pressure input module failed
CCSF09 Static pressure output module tailed
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Ca uses_1D Cause Dncription
EPRFOI Air compressor failed
EPRF01 Air dryer failed
EPRf 03 Air line tailed
EPRF~ Air filter failed
EPRF05 EP leaking
EPRF06 EP solenoid failed
EPRf 07 EP plastic housing failed
FADOI Fresh air damper motor failed
FADOl Fresh air damper control system failed
FADOl Fresh air damper motor linkage or ball join! failed
FAILOI Fresh air louver blades blocked by foreign matter
FAl102 Fresh air louver damaged or removed
FAl103 Fresh air louver broken
FO:-':OOI Blown Fuse
FD~OO2 Broken belts
FDNOO3 Lee se pulleys
FDNOO4 Electricity turned off
FDNOO5 Impeller touching housing
FONOO6 Wrong voltage
FDXOO7 Motor 100 small and overload protector has broken circuit
FDNOO8 low voltage excessive line drop or inadequate wire size
FDNOO9 load inertia [00 large for motor
FDNO IO Seized bearing
FNOI Impeller hitting inlet or housing
FN02 Impeller hitting cutoff
Fl"03 Drive
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Ca uses 10 Ca use Descrip ncn
FN04 Coupling
FN05 Bearing
FN06 Shaft seal squeal
FNO? Impe ller
FN08 Housin g
FN09 Fan motor
FNIO Shaft
FNIt High air veloc ity
FNl2 Obstructio n in high velocity gas stream
FNIJ Pulsation or surge
FN I-t. Gas velocity through cracks and holes
FN I5 Rattles and/or rumbles
FPSOI Heating water temperature is tOO low
FPS02 Heating circu lating pump motor tailed
FPS03 Outdoo r temperature is 10 0 co ld
FPS04 Healing pump impeller tailed
FPS05 Heating pump d irect coupling tailed
HAFOI System
HAF01 F,"
HSFOI Heating water tempera ture is too low
HSF02 Heating circulat ing pump failed
HSF03 Tube and lin covered by dirt and failed 10 transfer heat
HSF04 Heating coil ruptured
HSF05 Heating coil Contro l system failed
HSF06 Outdoor tempe rature is too cold
[SAFOI F, "
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Ca uses 10 Cause Descriplio n
ISAF02 Duct system
ISAF03 Filter
ISAF04 Coils
ISAF05 Re-circulation
ISAF06 Obstruction Fan Inlet
ISAF07 No straight duet at Ian outlet
ISAF08 Obstruction in high velocity air stream
PCHPOt Fan
pnl PO~ System
PCIIP03 Gas density
PCHPO~ Fan selection
PMPOI Bdts
PMP02 Bearing
PMP03 Sheaves
PMP~ Impellers
PMPOS Hub
PMP06 Coupling
PMP07 Shan
SHLOI Humidifier Control system failed
SHL02 Humidifier failed
SHL03 Humidifier Distribution System tailed
SHLO..l Fresh air humidity low
SPHOI Duet system
SPH02 Filler
SPHOJ Coils
SPLOt Gas density
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C:l us~s_I O Ca U5~ Dn cripfi on
SPL01 Duct
SPlOJ System
SPl ().l Fan
Fur example. a fresh air intake louver failure can becaused by the louver
becoming blocked with foreign matter. louver broken and louver damaged or
removed and these failure:modes arc coded as FAILOI. FAlL02 and FAILO)
respectively as shown in Table 6.1.
6.... 2 Pr oblems
The problems identified by RC~t techniques and shown in the respective
fault tree diagrams arestored in a table using lour fields. which are: problem
identification number; problem description, fault tree and RC~t lnforrnaticn
worksheet. as shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Prob lem Idrntifkalion
Pr oblrm_1D Problem Dr5criplion Fault Tr ee ReM
Inform:llion
WorkSh eet
AFFPF Air Filter Failure Figure B- 4,4 Table:A-3,4
Prob lem_1D Pro blem Dncriptioa Fa u ll Tree Re M
In fonna lion
WorkSheet
CSF Cooling syste m failed Hg ure B- 4.7 Table A- 3.7
CCSF Comp utet Control System Figure B· 4.18 Table A- 3.10
Fail ure
EPRF EP relay failed Figure B· 4.19 Tabl e A- 3.ll
FAD Fresh Air Damper Failure Figu re B- 4.3 TableA- 3.2
FAIL fre sh Air Intake l ou ver Figure 4.2 Table 3.1
FOSa Fan does not o perate Figure B- 4.16 Table A- 3.9Ft
FS Fan Noise Fi\1ure B-UO Ta ble A- 3.9A
FPS Freeze protection system Figure 8 -4.6 Table A- J .6
being activated
HAF High Air Flow Figure B- 4.12 Tab le A- 3.9Ct
HSF Heal ing System failed Figure B-4.5 Table A- 3.5
ISA F Ins ufficient Air Flow Figur e B- 4.11 Table A- 3.9B2
r CHP Power consumpt ion high Figure 8-4.15 Table A- 3.9E
problem
P:-'I P Premat ure failure Figure B-4.17 Table A- 3.9G1
SHH Spac e Humidity High Figure B- 4 .8 TableA- 3.8
SilL Space Humidity low Figure B- 4.8 Tabl e A- 3.8
SPH Sta tic press ure high Figure B- 4.14 Table A- 3.90
SPL Static pressure low Figure B· 4.13 Tabl e A- 3.90
For example. Fresh Air Louver Failure is coded. FAil under Prob lem_tO
in one co lumn and is show n as Fresh Air Lou ver Failure in anot her colum n as
prob lem description. The assoc iated Fault Tree Diagram is listed in the th ird
column . The assoc iated RC~ Information worksheet is listed in the fourth
column.
6.~.3 Symptoms
Simi larly all poss ible symptoms are stored in a data base table with
symp tom identificat ion as one co lumn and sym ptoms descrip tion in the other
column as sho wn in Table 6.3 .
T able 6.3 Symptoms Identifica tion
Symptoms ID Sym pt om s Dcs~riplion
SOl Air Flow too high
502 Air Flow too low
503 Air Noise level too high
504 Dust level too high
SUS f an does not operate
SO. Humidity level too high
5U7 Humidity level too low
508 Power usage too high
509 Static Pressure too high
510 Static Pressure too low
S II Temperature too high
5 12 Temperature too low
5 13 No No ise
514 Premature Failure
9.
For example. foreign matter (FAIL 01) wil l increase sys tem static pressu re
and this symptom is coded as 509 unde r SymptomsJ D in one co lumn and the
sym ptoms desc ription is shown in the oilier column as shown in Table 6.3.
Similarly . louve r broken (FAIL 02) and louver damaged or removed (FAll 03)
\\; 11 decrease sys tem static press ure. Th is sympt om is coded as 5 10 under
Sy mptoms) O as shown in Table 6.3.
6... .4 Events
Possible ccmbinaticns of problems. sym ptoms and causes are combined in
another table named Event which reco rds the problem identifi cation. symp tom
identification and cause identi ficatio n as shown in Tab le 6.4 .
Ta ble 6.... [venh
Pnble m_ 1D Sym plo ms_1D ClIUS"_1D
A FFPF 509 AFF PFOI
AfFPF SO< AFFPF02
AFFPF 509 AFFPF03
AFFPF 504 AFFPF04
CCSF 511 CCSFOI
CCSF 511 CC SF02
CCSF 511 CCSF03
CCSF S06 CCSF04
97
Problem_1D Symptoms ID Caus" _ID
CCSF S06 CCSFO;
CCSF S06 CCSF06
CCSF S09 CCSF07
CCSF S09 CCSF08
CCSF S09 CCSF09
CCSF SI:? CCSFOI
CCSF S12 CCSFO~
CCSF 512 CCSF03
CCSF S07 CCSF04
CCSF S07 CCSFO;
CCSF S07 CCSF06
(CSF S10 CCSF07
C( SF SIO CCSF08
((SF SIO CCSF09
CSF SII CSFOI
CSF SII CSF02
CSF SI I CSF03
CSF SII CSF04
CSF 5 11 CSF05
CSF 5 11 CSF06
CSF 5 12 CSF06
EPRF 505 EPRFO I
EPRF 505 EPRF02
EPRF 505 EPRF03
EPRF 505 EPRF04
EPRF 505 EPRF05
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Pto blcm_1D Symploms ID Causcs_1D
EPRf S05 EPRf06
EPRf S05 EPRf07
EPRf SIJ EPRfOI
EPRf S13 EPRf02
EPRf SIJ EPRfOJ
EPRf SIJ EPRf04
EPRf SIJ EPRf05
EPRf SIJ EPRf06
EPRF SI3 EPRF07
FAD S02 F.• D01
FAD S02 FAOO2
FAD S02 FADOJ
FAD S09 FADO I
FAD S09 FAOO2
FAD S09 FADOJ
FAil SOl FAl102
FAIL SOl FAll O)
FAil S02 FAILOI
FAil S09 FAllO I
FAil SIO FAIL02
FAIL S10 FAIL03
FOND S05 FDNOO I
FDND S05 FDNOOl
FDNO S05 FONDOJ
FDNO S05 FONOO4
FONO S05 FDNOO5
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Problem_1D Symptoms ID Cause5_1D
FOND 505 FONOO6
FOND 505 FOND07
FOND 505 FONDOS
FOND SOS FOND09
FOND S05 FONDIO
FOND Sil FONDa I
FONO Sil FONOO2
FOND 5 13 FONOO3
FONO 5 13 FON0 04
FONO 5 13 FONOOS
FOND SIl FOND06
FOND Sil FON0 07
FDNO S13 FOND08
FOND 513 FON0 09
FOND Si l FONOIO
FN 503 FNOI
FN SOl FN02
FN 503 FN03
FN 503 FN04
FN S03 FN05
FN 503 FN06
FN SOJ Fi'07
FN SOJ FN08
FN 503 FN09
FN 503 FNIO
FN SOJ FNII
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Problcm_1D Symploms_ID CausC5_1D
FN S03 FNll
FN S03 FNI3
FN S03 FNI4
FN 50j FNIS
FPSF SI3 FPSFOI
FPSF 513 FPSF02
FPSF S13 FP5fO)
FPSF SI3 FPSF04
FPSF 513 FPSFOS
FPSF 5J3 FP5F06
HAF SOl HAFOI
HAF SOl HAF02
HSF SII HSFOS
HSF SI2 HSFOI
HSF SI2 HSF02
HSF 512 HSF03
HSF S12 HSF04
HSF SI2 HSFOS
HSF SI2 HSF06
ISAF S02 ISAFO I
ISAF SOl ISAF02
ISAF 502 [SAFO)
ISAF S02 lSAF04
ISM 502 ISAFOS
ISAF 502 ISAf06
ISM S02 lSAf07
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Problem ID SymplomJ_1D C:lIlsts_1D
(SAF S02 [SAF08
PCHP S08 PCHPOI
PCHP S08 rCH P02
PCHP S08 PCHP03
PCHP S08 PCHP04
PMP S14 PMPOI
PM? SI4 PMP02
PMP SI4 PMP03
PM? SI4 PMP04
PMP SI4 PMP05
PMP S14 PMP06
PMP SI4 PMP07
SHL S07 SHLOI
SHL S07 SHL02
SHL 507 SHL03
SHL S07 SHL04
SHL S07 SHL05
SHH S06 CSFOI
SHH S06 CSF02
SHH S06 CSFOJ
SHH S06 CSF04
SHH S06 CSF05
SPH S09 SPH01
SPH S09 SPH02
SPH S09 SPHOJ
SPL SID SPLOI
[02
Fault tree anal ysis . RCM informatio n worksheet and the compo nent fa ilure
analysis as discus sed in Chapter 3 and ...can be linked to the output table usinl!: the
hyperl ink capabi lity cfthe -vticrcscrt Ace..-ss" software .
6.5 Adding the Weibull Analysis Into Ihe Knowledge -Based System
The com bination o f ReM and fa ult rrec analysis provide a systematic approach 10
acqui re knowledge and an understanding of system func tions. The knowledge acquired
can beused to r lnpur rc a database. This mood can be enhanced by using a mathematica l
mood. which is based on the stat istical results o f the com ponents ' failures.
Replacement due and the current d ue are needed in order to estab lish the
components' ages in hours. Thedatabase is modified to include this key element . The
Wcibull parameters. eta and beta an:determined from failure data, then a Weibull ana lysis
is used to determ ine the probability of failure F(t) for each failure mode, The expert
system can then predic t and prioriti ze the modes of fail ures according to the pro bability
of their occurrence.
For exam ple a HVAC system with the following param eters would illustrate this
concept.
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Table 6..5 Elli mple for ca lculation of F(1) based on Weibull Pa ra meters
'44
1.:11 - ') -1
852 88 10710 3.0370 6Q366.5 0.003
F(t) l .exp·('/~l (6 .1)
RD last replacement date
CD current date
duration in days
IIRS/WK Hours of operation per week
The value for eta and beta will be stored in the knowledge-based system based on
approp riate data from similar system. The age of the compone nts (I) in hours can be
determined based on last replacement date and the current date and the system weekly
operating hours. Detailed construction and applicati on of the knowledge-based sys tem is
shown in the next section.
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Tab le 6.5 [umple for ealeulatiun ofF(1) based on Weibull Parameten
'.:'* . ~ . (...,
f Adam~r . . -l./ lS.Ll~ .QL.L~L2..:..- ..±OlS.-l8___ il ::!66~.~ill":_ 51996.5.+0.61 2
t:t~;~IS=... =;~J%: ~ ~;g~: ; :9:~ ; :: -~ lk~ t~ ~-~~
f;l!lJ~~q!iniL-. _2:/15/9 J 6/15/9 ; 1946 ' 8S _,~4§'!J. lII ~__J.3:2780._0..118
F;ln .~IQ.tqL_ _2115/916/15f9 ! 1946! 88 ~4§:f.J1A§~..£~1$..;L Q.094
Pre..::ti]c~(__ + ,4115/9j 6/15f9 i 61~ 8L.1§l'L8.quJ.2£2.:..5"'ttl?,.!{j. 9".05-l.
fan ..... ) 1J.:i/9 16115/9 ! 194QUL...:"kH..~..liQ':'J .ll.:lll _O.9.31
Humidifier 5/1 .5!.9_'..§lJ}(~~3.S_ _. L41 5i..:J.:22.0..Q.:.51.@~,j . _0:..0 1 ~
E rd:w 1/13/9 , 6/ 15/9 852 8S 107 10.: 3.0370 : 69366.5 0.003
Fnl 1,~xp ' ( '/~ )I ! (6.' 1
RD last replacement dale
CD current date
duratio n in days
HRS iW K Hou rs of operation per wee k
The value for eta and beta will bestored in the know ledge-ba sed system based on
appropriate da ta from similar system. The age o f the components (t) in hOUTS can be
determined based on last replacement date and the current da te and the system weekly
operating haul'S. Detailed co nstruction and appli cat ion of the knowle dge -base d system is
shown in the next section.
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6.6 Design of the Re M Knowledge-Based Decision Support System
Conventio nal procedures for building an expert system were discussed in Sec tion
:U . Thedesign o f this proposed RCM database system differs from the conventiona l
proce dures by the method used to acquire knowledge and the method o r assigning
confidence level values. This database system uses ReM techniq ues to obtain knowledge .
The information idcruifled by RCM techniques is stored in to ur database tab les: Events.
Causes . Prob lems and Symptoms . 3Sdiscussed in Sec tion 6 .4. The value lor a confidence
leve l is based on the Weibull parameters and the usage:time of the:compo nent in ques tion
as illustrat..-d in Secttc n 6 .5.
The tour tables Events. Ca uses. Prob lems. and Sympto ms are linked in Microsoft
Access database . The required Iields are selec ted to produce the derived table shown in
Figure 6.1. By us ing this de rived table as the start ing point lor Queries. desired records
can be fou nd using the given criteria for knc ....n field or fields.
lOS
Events Table
COlUS~li Tab le
Symp toms Table
Problems Tab le
Derived Dataset
Figure 6.1 Retattonal Database
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fo r example . the fresh air louver failure is caused by the following:
FAllOI
FAll02
F.-\l 1 03
louver blocked by forei~n matter
louver broken
louver damaged or removed
FAllOI will cause the fresh air louver failu re and is linked to ProblemJ D FAIL.
FAILOI will cause low air 110 w and is linked to Symplom sJ D 501. 113 150 will C3U5e high
Sialic pressure and linked 10 SymptomsJD S09.
FAILu:! will cause the fresh air louver failure and is linked 10 Probh::m_1D FAIL
FAILOl will cause high air 110wand is linked to Symptoms_SOl . II alsowill cause le w
static pn..-ssure and link 10 SymplomJ D 5 10.
FAl103 will cause the fresh air louver failure at1\! is linked to Problern_1D FAIL.
FAIL03 will cause high air !low and is linked 10 Symploms_SOI. It 3 150 will cause low
stat ic press ure and link 10 S~'mp(omJD SIO.
Causc:sJ D can be identified either from ProblemJD or SymplomsJD. In
practice. befor e a system or a component failure. there is usually a symptom that can be
identified and from this symptom. the causes can be traced back to the components and
from the components to the 1'00 1 causes.
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The detailed opera tional steps which show how the database tab les are queried .
us ing either symptoms or problem, are sho wn in sectio n 6.6.2. with sampl e outputs
shown in Table 0-6.13 to Ta ble 0- 6.26 in Appen dix O.
The propose d know ledge-based sys tem must be able to search root causes and also
predic t the F(Il . The information identified by Wei bull analys is in order to determ ine F{t)
is stored in a tabl e using ten fields. These are: last replacemen t da te. curren t date .
duration in days. hours of operation per week. the total operati ng hou rs. beta. eta. F(C).
Rtt ) and CO F graph. Predictions canbeachieved by add ing the above field in Table 6.1
in order to force operators and maintenance personnel [0 recordinformation at the root
cause leve l.
6.6. 1 Tables Design
Failure modes identified in the ReM table can becoded as CausesJD
(ca use identific ation). which are the root ca uses of failure. A table named "Causes
ldenti ficarion" with the follow ing fields is developed and listed as follows:
Table 6.6 Ca uses Identilicalion
Descriplion
Codi ng for Causes
Ca use desc ription
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Fitlt.l Namc Oala Type Dncrip tion
RD Date/Time last replacement date
CD Datefrime Curren t Date
Duration Number Number o f days between RD and CD
Hrs/WK Numbe r Hours of o peratio n per week
, Number Total hour s of operation
beta Number parameter in Weibu ll analysis
eta Number parameter in Weibull analy sis
F( t) Number Probability o f fai lure
RU) Num ber Reliabi lity
CDF Gra ph Hyperlin k ldentiticaricn link to CDF Graph
The problems identified by ReM techniques and shown in related fault
tree diagrams are stored in a table named " Problem ldentificatic n' and listed as
follows:
Ta ble 6.7 Prob lem Idenl irH:al ion
Field Namt Dat a T~'pe lksc::rip lion
Problem ID Text Codi ng for problem
Problem Description Text Problem descri ption
Fault Tree Hyperlink Link to fault tree Diagram
F(tJ Number Probability c ffai lure
RC\I Hyperlink RL'\1 Iuble
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Simil ar ly al l possible symptoms can be stored in a tab le named "Sy mptom
ldent ificmic n" with symptom identi fication as one row and the othe r row wi th
symp to m desc ription as list.
Table 6.8 Symptom ldentilkano n
Possible combi nations of problems. symp toms and causes are com bined in
another tab le named "Events' and lis ted as follo ws:
Table 6.9 Ennis
Field Na me Data T ype Desfi:ription
Prob lemJ D Text Coding for Problem
Sympto ms ID Tex i Codi ng for Symptoms
Causes ID Text Coding for Causes
6.6.2 Q uery Design
There are a number of symptoms that exist in the system whic h can use
backw ard cha ining to ident ify problems and causes that produce certa in symptoms
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and 10 determine f(t) and R(t) of specific components. This can beperformed
using Query in the Microsoft Assess and are discussed in the following section.
6.6.2.1 Searching methodology [or root causes using
Symptoms
The: tour tables "Events", "Problem", 'Symptom" and "Causes" are
used to design the query. The Field "Problem)D" in the "Event" table is
linked to "Prcblc mHr' field in "Problem" table. The "Symptoms) D"
field in "Event" table is linked to "Symptoms)D" lield in "Symptom"
table. The "Causes)D" field in the "Even!' table is also linked to the
"Causes_ID" in the "Causes" Table.
The query consists of the following fields: Symptoms)D.
Symptorns Description. Problem Description. and Causes Description .
These fields an: laid out in the above sequence as shown. The criteria
under Symptoms)O is "(LIKE]'". This selection criteria allows a user to
key in or select the Symptom using a specific code from the keyboard . The
code for SymptomsJO is shO\-TIin Table 6.3. With the Symptoms)D. the
root causes can bedetermined. Detailed design oft he query is shown in
Table6. tO.
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The processing is centered on how to obtain an output that should
list all causes that will create a certain symptom and then calculate F(t}and
R(t) based on hours of operation. A query named "Query by Symptom"
with the following fields is designed as follows:
Tabl e6.10 Query by Symplom
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
Fid d: Problem [0 SymptomsJD Symptoms Description
Table: Events Events Symptom
Son:
Show:
" " "Criteria: [L1KEj
or:
Column ~ Column 5 Column 6
r idd : Problem Description Fault Tree RD
Table: Problem Problem Causes
Sort:
Show:
" " "Criteria:
or:
Column 7 Column 8 Colum n 9
Fidd : CD HRS/WK t:[Durationj" rHRS/Wkll7
Table: Causes Causes
Sort:
Show:
" " "
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ICriteria: I
lor: I
Column 10 Co lumn II Column 12
Fidd : bela eta F{t):
1-IExp(- I"U[lj/l' ''IYl b<t. j)))
Table: CauS!:S Causes
Son:
Show
" " "Criteria:
or:
6.6.2.2 Ginn the Problem Use Symptom to Determ ine
the Root Ca uses
Pinpointing the root cause based on moe problemJO identifies
additional information supplied from SymplomsJ O. the causes-In and
Description.
The procedure to detect root causes is described as follows:
The four tables - Ever ns", "Problem". Symptomr and "Causes" are used to
design the query. The Field "PrcbelmHr" in the "Event" table is linked 10
" ProblemJ D" field in "Problem" table. The Symptoms_ID" field in
"Event" table is linked to -sy mptomsJO- field in -Sy mpoom-table. TlK
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-causes)D~ field in the " Event" table is also linked to the - causesJD" in
the -Causes" Table .
The query consists of the follov.ing lieIds:
Problem) D. Problem Description. S)"mploms)D. Symptoms Descrip tion
and Causes Description. These fields are laid out in w sequences as
shown above. The criteria under Probh.:m) D is - [LIKE ]"". This selection
criteria allows user to key in the Problem from Key board. The criteria fo r
SymptomsJD is set as [. ). This allows user to key in the Symptoms) D
from keyboard . With the Problem_lD and the Symptoms_lD. the root
causes can be:determined. Detailed design of the query by this method is
shown in Table 6. 11.
The processing is centered on a given problem OUId using additional
information from Symptom to obtain an output that should list all
associated causes OUId then calculate Fit}and R(t) based on hours o f
operation. A query named ' 'QUCT)" by Problem and Symptom - with the
fo llowing fields is designed as follows:
Ta hle 6.11 Qu~ry b~' Prob lem and S)"mpIOm
Colum n I Colum n 2 Colum n J
Fidd: Probkm_ID Problem Symp lomsJD
Descripricn
Table: Problem Problem Symptom
Son:
Show III III III
Criteria: [Enter Problem 10 Code ) [Enter Sympto m 10
Code)
or:
Colum n .- Colum n 5 Colum n 6
Fid d: Symptom s Description RD CO
Tabll:: Symptom Causes Causes
Son :
Show III III III
Cri teria:
or:
Colum n 1 Column 8 Column 9
Fidd: HRS'\VK Duration: 1:[Duration)·(HRSIWk )17
DaleDit1{- d- .{RD)
.[COII
Table: Causes
Sort:
Show III III III
Criteria:
or:
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Column [0 Column 11 Column 12
Fid d: eta b<1a F(l): I-(Exp(- ( '([tJI[etaW[botaj)))
Table: Causes Causes
Son:
Show II!
'" '"Criteria:
or:
6.6.3 Output
The output identities the problems and causes that are associated with each
symptom. Tables showing the problems and causes are listed in Table 0 -6. 13 to
D-6.26 in Appendix D.
Th...query does not create a specific report in a form that is dearly
illustrated. Iheretore. a customized report must be created such as Table 6. 12
which leaves no doubt of accuracy in reading the material. Detailed procedures
for creating a report can be found in Adamski ( 1996).
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Chapter 7 MUN HVAC Case Study
7.1 Data Co llect ion
lh ere are many buildings located at the Memor ial University of Newfoundland
campus. However. most of them wen: built in the 1960 and 1970's. II is extremely hard to
obtain failure data lor the older buildings. However. Biotechnology Building started
function on April 11J<J2. Arts & Administration Building Extension started functioning on
April 1992 and Earth Resource (CERR) Building started functioning on September 19S9.
Th...~ three buildings were selected to beUSI:d for data collection because they are
relatively new and failure data were available. Each builJinJ!sun date was obtained from
the University Worksdepartment. Detailedequipment specification and drawings were
obtained through HoneywellInc. Equipment operating schedules were obtained from
Honeywell Inc and reconfirmed by University Works in order 10 establish time in
operation before failure occurred. Existing maintenance practice for buildings under study
is shown in Appendix H.
Information concerning the selected buildings is ..lescribed as follows:
Il8
Biotechnology Building is located in the south campus and is a three storey building with
2512.7 square metres in area. There are threeair handling units located inside the building
to serve the building ventilation requirement. Detailed information concerning each air
handlin!;tunit is shown in Appendix E.
Ans and Administraiicn Extension is located in the south campus and is a " storey
building with 8414.5 square metres in area. There are three air handling units located
inside the building to serve the building ventilation requirement. Detailed informnticn
concerning each air handling unit is sho....n in Appendix F.
Earth Resource ICERR) Building is located in the north campus and is a 6 storey building
with 21173.3 square metres in area. There an: six air handling units located inside the
building to serve the builJing ventiknicn requirement. Two units an: used tor laboratory
ventilation, three units are used lor make up air requirement. and one unit is used tor
general ventilation. Detailed information concerning COlen air handling unit is shewn in
Appendix G.
7.2 Data Ana lysis
The building data was collected and stored in data base table by using Access Data
program. Each record consists ofte n fields and the fields are listed as follows:
work-order II
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date
time
building
room #
mun (Memoria l Univers ity of Newfoundl and }wo# (work order
number)
requested by
performed by
des crip tion of the problem
solution to the problem
However. work orde r #. MUN work order #. requested by and pertc rmed by fields
are not related to our pro blem and are ignored,
The fields in each reco rd were rearranged as follows:
building
date
lime
rooms
description of problem
solu tion to the problem
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Since each building has a different operating sched ule. in o rder to estab lish a
mean ingf ul study. the unit use for this stud y will becperaring hour .
There an: many failure mode s and they are listed as follow s:
fan belts broken
fan moto r failure
system unsched uled shutdow n due to freeze protection
fresh da mper moto r failu re
air filte r failure and cause system failure
fan bearing failure
The study consists ofthree dements:
a deta il study o f the functions of each co mponent in the system
a fault tree analys is
a mathemat ical model base d o n Weibull ana lysis to assess the
likelihood of cause offailu re. since an expert sys tem cann ot hand le
uncerta inty
7.3 Methodo logy
Data from eac h building was studied in iso latio n where possi ble to de term ine the
param eters ofthe Weibull failure dis tribution. eta and beta,usin g Weilbul l Sm ith
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Computer software developed by Fulton Findin gs 1M . Then. data from a num ber of
buildings will becombined to dete rmine overal l eta andbeta . This data will be:used 10
determine rel iability in the math ema tical model. Detai led inpu t andoutpu t lo r this
methodolog y is shown in Chap ter 6
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C ha pter 8 Results and Discussion
This chapte r presents the results and discuss ion of:
Application of ReM process to a physica l system. in this case a
HVAC system. 10 acqui re intended functions. func tiona l failures.
failure modes (cause of failure) and failure effects:
The failure modes iden tified by the ReM process are used to
develop fault trees and are coded in the databases:
J . Perform failure data analysis using.the Weil bull dis tribution 10
dete rmine param eters ;
~ . Using the paralle l. series and complex modelling syste m to develop
a mathematical model:
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5. Using a commercial da tabase systemto build a know ledge-based
sys tem based on the ReM. fault tree, Weibull dis tribu tion and the
devel oped mathemat ica l model.
8.1 ReM
RCM tables in Appendix A are developed as the result of the RCM process. These
tables highlighted the compo nents under anal ysis, intended functio ns. functional failu res.
failure modes (cause of failure) and failure effe cts of the co mpo nents. These tables
pro vide a systematic way to acqu ire and o rganize knowledge. The knowledge acqu ired
has proved ro be fundamentally sound. and can be expl ained by parameters in eng ineering
equations. For the HVAC system under this study . these parameters are temperatur e.
humid ity. pressure. and flow rate.
The know ledge acquire d from the RCM process is cross -referenced with
knowledge de rived from a select panel ofprcfessionul engineers and desig ne rs. Th is
group brings togethe r HVAC cons ultants. teache rs. equipment suppliers. and individuals
with experience in ope rating and maintainin g HVAC syste ms. inclu ding staff from
Honeywell .
This panel includ es :
- David Thom pson. P. Eng.. an HVAC equip ment supp lier and former
co nsulting engineer.
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- \1 ichad Hea ley. P. Eng.•an HVAC equipment suppli er and former
college instructor and mec hanica l contractor.
• Dave Smith. P. Eng.• a consuh ing engineer and former co llege HVAC
instructor.
• Asbok Cho wdhury . P. Eng" a coll ege HVAC instructor and former
consulting engineer.
• Ray Gree n. Honeywell Inc.. HVAC systems - maintenanc e
• Paul Walsh. Honeywell Inc.. HVAC systems · mainte nance
Many participants agree thai the systematic approach of acquirin g knowled ge is
much better than the conve ntiona l method. This again can Deconti nned fro m Ontario
Hydro which hired co nsultants with RCM exper ience to revamp the ir mainte nance
programs and the Iron Ore Comp any of Canada which is having its key main tenance
personne l trained in the RCM process.
The feedbackfrom three di fferent perspecti ves are discussed. From the engineers'
perspec tive. RC\ I process forces them 10 identify all intended funct ions that the system
must be able to meet. Th is helps in formulating gooJ design criteri a and communicates
this information to the operators and own ers. Th is also acts as a check list for the design .
From the opera tors ' perspective , the results of the RCM process can help them to
understand the system beca use the causes offu nctiona l failures are included in the RC~t
tables. Th is helps them in the troubleshoo ting process and speeds up the setup and
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adjustment required afte r eac h fai lure. From the maintenance personnel' s perspect ive.
they will understandthe maintenance requirements. Fai lure mod es can serv e as criteria for
instrumentation require ment in the design and the cons truction o f sys tem . Areas where
effects cffunct ic nalIailures will have safet y and environmental effects must be moni tored
by senso rs 10 predic t fail ures.
RCM provides the prope r method ology 10 acquire knowl edg e lor the develo pmen t
of an expert sys tem . An RCM knowle dge-bas ed syste m that reaso ns from first principles
ri.c .. causa l reaso ning) and requir es a speci fication of the functional ity of the device's
cornpo ncnrs 10 d iagnose faults can bedeveloped without the use o f a doma in expe rt or
"shallow rules".
The follow ing prob lems usua lly associated with conventional expert systems can
be addressed th rough ReM techn iques :
Shallow reason ing is incapable of handling unanticipated faults .
") Signilic an t lag time exists between initial constructi on of a de vice
and the de velopment o f a conventi onal expert sys tem lo r
maintenance .
.J , Device s commonly go throug h 3 series o f design modi fications. and
it is unclear whether a shallow reasoning fault ad visor is still correc t
after suc h mod ifica tion.
126
ReM provides a formal documentation which ena bles des igners 10 communicate
e ffectively to the ope rators and maintenance personn el. It also serves as the first step
towards total quality improvement. Without such doc ument. it is extre mely hard to
implement cont inuous qual ity improvement. RCM is necessary to gain control c fcn
cpe raricn. It is time consuming and expens ive up front. RCM's returns are nor realized
q uick ly.
ReM can 1>1: applied 10 any physical system . such as an elec trical system whose
performance can be explained by voltage and current . or a civi l related system which can
be e -..plained by stress and strength.
8.2 Fa ult T ree
The fault trees developed in Append ix B an: ~uod visual diagrams rcr c perarc rs to
understand the interrel atio n o f vario us failure modo that contribute to component fail ure.
Failure modes can hi:coded and then used in a database. Failure modes identifi ed an: a
good refe rence mal...rial for Root Failure Cause Analysis. which is requ ired by the
operators and maintenance personnel to operate and ser...ice the system effi cient ly and
e ffe ctively. Fault Tree is a well accepted technique and appropriate for li nding failure
relationships. However. large fault trees an: di fficult to understand . bear no resemblance to
system flow sheet
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8.3 Failure Data Analysis
Analysis of failure data wiUenable the eta and beta parameters in the Weibull
d istribution to bedetermined: this Weibu ll distribution can then be used 10 provide
reasonable failure forecasts with extremely small samp les. Mathematical models
developed can be used to quantify the probability of failure. This quantitative approach
based on operat ing hours is far more reliable than the confidence level establish ed by
experts in conventional expert systems, which in some cases cannot besubstantiated.
Further. failures can be minimized by comparing fa ilure data between systems. A
discuss ion oft ailu re data for HVAC systems installed in three buildings at the Memorial
Univers ity ofNewfoundland is given in the fo llowing sections.
8.3.1 Failur e of Fresh Air Intake Louver
fa ilure of fresh air intake louver is usually due to corrosion but there was
no sign oftailu re during the span oft he study. The location of the fresh air intake
louver will affect the quality ofair. Ifit is located near the path of car exhausts . il
will cause poor air quality in the building. Further. the mounting height from the
finish grade and the facing direction of the louver will affect performance ofthe
pre-filter and cause the freeze protect system to be activated. This is discuss ed in
more detail in sub-sections 8 .3 and 8.S.
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8.3.2 Fa ilure of Link age in Fresh Air Dam per
The linkage usually breaks down e n the fresh air damper after a
certain length of lime because the ball joint becomes worn. The remedial
action ....us to replace theball join! and adjust or replace (he linka ge.
Failure data are present in Table 8.1 as shewn.
Table 8, I Failu re Data (or Frn h :\ ir Damper
Build ing ~ame System Name and TlI 'K' FailUR Data
AnslExl AHU#I VAV nol3ilureaftlZr j~8lhrs
fArts &-Adminiss raua n tair han d/i nK unit
Bui/dinK Extension uf number)
u cx, tvar iab le air \"O/umI!J
AnSIEx! AHUp2 Constant Vol no failure after jlJ..lIUhrs
Buncchnulogy AHU#! one fa ilure after 2894-1hrs
no failu re utter 26 135 hrs
Biotechnology AHVI#2 no failure after 55080 HRS
CERR GVU·I one failure cner 17326 hrs
(g f!M ral venul aung unit) no failure utter 11028 HRS
("ERR LMV- I no failure after 805-« HRS
(lubu ru fUry mulcl!up unit)
("ERR l MU-2 one failure after H680 hrs
no failure after -I 58~ HRS
CERR LMU-3 one failure after -19632 hours
no failure after 309 11 hours
CERR lVU·1 no failure after 38354 HRS
Ilabaratary Vf!ntiltlt ing
unit)
CERR l VU-1 no failure aner 38354 hrs.
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Based on the abo ve failure data.
the eta is determined to equal 51996.59. and
the beta is determined to equal J .85332l .
8.3.3 Failure of Pre-Filters and Filters
The lite span of the filters is undete rmined and is mainl y affected by
the operating environment. The pre-filter chan ge policy hadchanged from
once eve ry three months to a full year. and then furthe r revised to once
every six months . The air filters were changed once a year or when the
static pressure drop through the filter reached 25 mm. Filters can be
damage d by snow or undesired dampness in fresh air. The pre-filters Wert
occa sionall y out of place mainly because the filter medium sagged. The
Arts & Administratio n Building Extension with intake louve r located high
up on me wall surface at Ie..-el 5. facing South West and with a low
\'dodty of 1.2 mls. experienced no filter failure due to rain or snow . The
Biotechn ology bui lding system tripped out due to freeze protection system
in 1996. The intake louver is facing North and at ground level with intake
veloc ity of 1.6152 m1s0.1the intake louver and 0.6 167 m/s in the intake
plenum. The intake louver is higher than the intake for the air handlin g
syste m. and this caused stratifica tion and allowed snow to enter the unit.
The CERR build ing with intake louve r facing North and at grou nd level
had experie nced system shut down 12 times due to freeze protec tion
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sys tem. but no failure due to filter medium sagging in pre-fil ter. This is
mainly because of the long distance between air intake louver and the
motorized damper 10 the HVAC units. Failure data fo r the pre-filler is
presented in Table 8.2 and failure data for the tiller is presented in Table
8.3.
Ta ble 8.2 Failure Data for Pre-filter
Building v ame System name Fai lure data
Ans/EX T All system 2 [60 hours
4320 hours
8640 hours
Biotechno logy All sys tem 1[60 hours
4320 hours
8640 hours
CERR All system 2 160 hours
4320 hours
8640 hours
Based on the above findings.
eta is determi ned to equal 5997 .463. and
beta is determined to equa l 1.398.
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Filter
Table 8.3 Failure Data for Air Filler
Building Name System name Failur e data
AnslEX T Allsystem 8640 hours
Biotechnology Allsystem 8640 hours
CERR Allsystem 11640 hours
Based on the above li nd ings.
eta is determined to equal 8658 and
bela is determined to equal 221.6 1
Pre-filte r and filter manufacturers recommend maintenance
programs. However. most do not conside r the "operating context". The
present scheduled maintenanc e program tor pre-filter and tiller is
questio nable because it is the same tor all build ings with different working
environments and diffe rent operating conditions . The timing tor sched uled
maintenance tor pre-filter had been changed three times with no sound
rationale for Preventi ve Maintenance (PM) actions. The predictive
maintenance strategy for measurement of pressure drop through the filter is
a good strategy. However, the setting is set so high that the effectiveness is
questionable. Furthe r. there is no monitoring. in the pre-filte r section where
the life span is much shorter than the filter. The current practice should be
re-evaluated because conditioning monitoring has the potent ial for
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significant payoff when it can beused lO tell wben it is necessary to
perform some maintenance task. thus precluding both unnecessary as well
as premature preventive maintenance actions that otherwise would occur.
8.3." Failure of Heat ing Coil
Only one heating coil failure occurred on December 27. 1998 in the:
CERR Building when: the heating coil in lMU -2 was frozen. The cause of
failure is still under investiga tion by Unive rsity Works. There ....-ere human
errors in a few instances. For example . the heat pump was turned o tf in
Ans/Ext building and the scheduled water temperature was turned down.
There is nOI enough failure data in this case to predict failure.
T abl e 8.4 F.i lurt Data for He:ll in g Coil
Building SyslemN.me Failure da la Reason
and Type
~ame
Arts/Ext AHU;;I &2 failed on Aug 28/95 Heat pump c ff
after 15727.7 hours
Arts/ Ext AHU# ! & 2 failed on Jan 30/96 Scheduled water
after 17687.35 hours was turned down
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Hui ldin g SY51em Nlime Failu re dat a Reason
lind T ype
Name
CERR LMU·2 failed on Dec28198 heaun g coil frozen
after 81n Ohours
coil. but also the heating circ ulating pump. whic h in tum depend s on the
pump motor. direct coupling and impelle rs. The cause ofrecent heating
coilfailure sho uld be identifi ed.
8.3.5 Failure of Freeze Protection System
System failures due to freeze protec tion did not occur in the Arts &.
Administrat ion Building Extension, mainly because the intake louv er is
1000i.Ited high up on the wall surface at level .sand facing South West . The
Bio technology building.experien ced system trip oc t due to Iree zesta t in
\1196. The intake louver is facing Xonh :.mdal ground level. The intake
louver is highe r than the intake for the air hand ling.system and this caused
stra tifica tion and allowed snow to enter the unit.
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Table 8.5 Fa ilure Data for Feeeae Protectio n
Building :"lame System Name and type F_i1ure Data
AnslE:tt AHUtll VAV no failure after 3~8 1
I\oun
Arts/E."t AHUIf2VAV no failure after 30481
hours
Biotechnology AHUtll VAV no failure after 17197
hours
Biotechnology AHU#2 Constant failure once on
Volume 121021/96
CERR GVU·I nut known-
CERR LMU· ! tailed on 30/01/97
CERR LMU-2 not kno....n
Coil frozen on Dec
~8198
CERR L~IU·3 tailed on :W ll l9j
CERR LVU-l railedon 28102195
tailed on 22101,'97
CERR LVU·2 tailed on 1 ~f12J95
failed on IlJ OIl%
tailed on 20102/96
failed on 17/01197
tailed on 2-l101197
However. there are three more failures in CERR building due to
freeze protection in 1~/O2l9~ . 13 / 1 2J9~ and j 1/ IOf95. but the record failed
to clearly identify with which units in the building.
135
Most ofthe failures occurred in late October to February and only
happened 10the units with North facing air louver. Therefore. the
probab ility should be conditional probability based on lime of the year. and
is independent of usage.
In addition to the climatic condition. freeze protection is also a
function of the reliability of the heating circulating pump. which depends
on the pump motor. direct coupling and impellers.
Discussion with opera tors and maintenance personne l indicated that
th<:y only have time to restore the system back to operation. They are no t
given enough time to investigate why the equipme nt fa iled. and hence. how
to correc t the deficiency permanently. The result is that the same problem
recurs. This repetitive failure problem can only be resolved once the root
cause of equip ment failure is understood and resources suppl ied to remove
the root cause.
8.3.6 Failure of Coo ling Coil
There is no cooling capability in the CERR build ing. Therefore
there are no cooling coils in the heating and ventilating units. There were
no cooling fa ilures in the Arts/Ext building. There was only one failure in
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the control valve after 37320 bows of operation. Unfortunately there were
nOI enough data to perform any meaningful modeling. In Newfoundland.
the cooling requirement is very shon. and with visual inspection once a
year in spring before cooling system stan up may besufficient to ensure the
required reliability.
TllIbllr8.6 Failure Data rcr Cooling Coil
Building System Name Failurlr DlIlll
Name lind Type
AnslExl AHUIi! no failure after 3048\ hours
AnslE.xt AHU#2 no failure after 30481 hours
Biolcchnolol::Y AHU#I
Biotechnology A HU#2 Control valve failed after 37320 hours
CERR no cooling coil exists
8.3.7 Fatture of Humidifiers
There WeR' no proper records on the failure of the humidifiers
because Honeywell Inc. was not responsible for the maintenanceofme
humidifiers. On an October 1998 site visit. the following findings were
noted.
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The steam distributors for AnslE.'I(tbuilding were loca ted in the duc t
work 10000ted downstream of the fan section . All hwn idifiers in the
ArtsIE.'I({ building were working proper ly. In the Biotechnology and CERR
buildi ng. all hwnid ification steam distributors are located upstream of the
lim section wi thin the air hand ling units. There were corrosion problems in
the Ian sections mainly due to the high humidity level. In the CERR
building. all hwn idi fiers failed at the end o f 1997 and the system ....'as not
working. Although there were two humid ificat ion systems in the
Biotechno logy build ing . there was only o ne working . Failure data are
presented in Table 8.7.
Ta ble 8.7 F:ailu te Data rOt Humidili en
Buildin g N:II me SysrcmN:amc F:IIilu re d illil Reason
Ansl Ext AHVli l no failure after 3048 1 hours
Arts'Ext AHU#l no failure after 30481 hours
Biotechnology AHU"I System ....'35 never in operation
Biotech nology AHlJ#2 Humidification was low afte r Breaker was shut
29856 hours otT.
CERR GVU· ! failed after 33737 hours
CERR LMU- I Failed after 70848 hours
CERR LMU-2 failed after 70848 hours
CERR LMU-J failed after 70H4Hhours
CERR LVU·I failed after 33737 hours
CERR LVU·2 Failed after 33737 hours
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Based on the above data,
eta was determi ned to equal 57608.58. and
beta was determined to equal 2.999.
8.3.8 Fan Failure
8.3.8.1 Fan Belts
Most hot water hearing or steam heating systems arc:
required to have the heating co il on when the systems shut down .
This is a protecti on proced ure 10 prevent the coi l from freezi ng.
This procedure may create temperatures as high as SOdegree C
within the unit This causes Ian belts to deteriorate and leads to
premature belt failure. Fan belts located in the return system or heat
recovery system had life spans 2 to 3 times longer than those in the
supply system. This is mainly J ue to the fact that the Ian belts were
exposed to constant room tempera ture and not subject to the nigh
heat situation of the supply system.
Also the arrangeme nt ofth e fan motor will affect the life
span of the belts . If the fan motor and the belts are located outside
the unit at a cons tant ambient temperature. the bells usual ly last
longer because they are not subjected to high temperature .
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8.3.8.2 Remedial Action
The above fai lures can be rectified by new control methods.
For a recirculating system, when the unit is running, the heating coi l
will becontrolled by the supply air temperatu re sensor. When the
unit is shut down. the coil will be controlled from a mixed air
sensor to prevent overhea ting while still protecting the heating coil.
In 100% fresh air units. an extrasenso r located upstream of the coil
will be added to control the coil when the unit is shut down .
Since tan belts seem 10 be the weakest link in the Ia n. it is
highly recommended that the following information should be
checked:
• motor horse power
• motor driver rpm
• driven (fan) rpm
• cente r distance between moto r shaft and fan shaft
• the d iameter of the motor shaft and the diameter of the fan
shaft
Compu ter analysis should be employed to ensure proper
selectio n of fan belts.
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Building Name System Name and Type Failure Data
Am/Ext AHU# I VAV with only one set of belts
failure after 6385 hours
Arts/Ext AHU#2 VAV with only one set of belts
failure after 11505 hours
Arts/Ext AHU#3 Constant Volume no failure after 17197 hours
Biotechnology AHU#I VAV failed after 18766.0 hours
Biotechnology AHUI#2 Constant Volume tailed alter 14789.29 hours
Biot.:chnology AHUilI] Heat Reclaim with only one belt failure alter
467Q.4 hours
,ERR l MU#1
CERR LMU#l
CERR LMU#]
("ERR lVU# 1
CERR l VUi=2
CERR GVU# I
Bused on the above findings.
eta has been determined to equaI 20460U . and
beta has been determined 10 l:'qual2.1467.
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8.3.8.3 Vortex Vanes
T.able 8.9 Failure Dat a Ier Vortn Vanes
Buildin g S a me SYltr m Name and Type hilun Dat a
Anst Ell( AHU #1 VAV no failure after 28990 hours
Arts/ Ext AHU #~ VAV no failure after 28990 hours
Arts/Ext AHU #3 Constant no failure atter 17200 hours
Volume
Biotechnology AHUI#IVAV failure after 20079.97 hours
Biotechnology AHUI#2 Constant N/A
Volume
Biotechnology AHL!#3 Heat Reclaim ;-.1/..\
CERR LMU# I with only one failure utter
59232 hours
CERR LMU#2 with only one failure after
74856 hours
CERR L~tU#3 N/A
CERR LVU#I nofailure after 37977 hours
CERR LVUI#2 no failure after 37977 hours
CERR GVU# I no failure after 37977 hours
Based on the above findings.
eta has been determin ed to equal 68043.08. and
beta hasbeen determined to equal 1.639.
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8.3.8.4 Fan Bear ing
During the unoccup ied period . due to the freezeprotection.
the greasewi ll dry up much faster and cause the bearing to fail.
Table 8.10 Failure Oala ror Fan Bu rin g
Bui ldi ng System Name and rype Failure Data
Name
Arts/Ex t A HU # 1 VA V no failure aft er 28900 hours
An siExt A HU #1 VAV no fail ure after 28900 hours
Arts/Ext A BU #3 Constant Volume no failure aft er 17200 hours
Biotech nolog y A BU ,; 1 VAV no failure afte r 55176 hou rs
Biotechnology AHU #2 Constant Volume with only one failure after 31272 hours
Biotechnology A HU_] Heat Rec laim no fa ilure after 55176 hours
CERR LMU #1VAV no failure afte r 79752 hours
CERR LMU#2 VAV fa ilure after 75528 hours
( ERR LM U#] Variable Speed no failure after 79752 hours
(ERR LVl: #1 VAV no failure utter 37977 hours
CERR LVU#2 VAV no failure after 37977 hours
CERR GV U#I VAV no fa ilure after 37977 hours
Based on the above findings.
eta has been determ ined to equa l 132780.2. and
be ta has been determined to eq ual I. 712307
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8.3.8.5 Fan Assembly
Table8.11 Failure Dala ror Fan An embly
Building Syslem Name and Iype Failure Dala
Name
Arts/Ext AHU #1 VAV no failure after 28900 hours
Arts/ Ext AHU #2 VAV no failure after 28900 hours
Arts/Ext AHU #3 Constant Volume no failure after 17200 hours
Biotechnology AHU #1 VAV no failure after 55176 hours
Biotechnology AHU #2 Constant Volume no failure after 55176 hours
Biotechnology AHU #3 Heat Reclaim no failure after 55176 hours
CERR LMU#! no fai lure after 79752 hours
CERR LMU#2 failure utter 75528 hours
CERR LMU#) no failure after 79752 hours
CERR LVU# I failure after 35965 hours
CERR LVU#2 no failure alief 37977 hours
CERR GVU#I no failure after 37977 hours
Based on the above tindings.
eta has been determined to equal 121417.4. and
beta has been determined to equal 2.035.
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8.3.8.6 Fan Motor
FilIImo tors used in a variable volume system ....i ll have a
shorter li fespan than motors wor king in a constant volume system.
In older designs. the ma lar for the air handlin g unit was located
outsi de theai r stream . The motor was not influenced by the air
Ilow. However. in the new design. the ma lar is located within the
unit and intlucnced by the air temperature and the humidity level of
theair. High humidity willcau se a motor which is not tota ll ~
enclo sed to corrode and bum out. High tempera ture will cause the
mo tor to fail because most ofthe moto rs in thi s type of epplicnice
are nor dc:signed to operate in high tempera ture environmen t.
Failure da ta is presented in Tabl e S.ll.
Tabl e 8.12 Failure Dala ror Fan Molar
Build ing Sy!lem Name and type Failure Dala
Nam e
Arts/ Ext AHU# I VAV no failure arter 28990 hours
Arts/ Ext AHU# 2 VA V 00 fai lure after 28990 ho urs
Arts/Ext AHU#] Co nstant Volume no failure:after 17100 hours
Biotechnolo gy AHU# l VAV mot or failed after 22800 hour s
Biotechnology AHU#2 Cons tant Vol ume no failure att er 55176 hours
Biotechnology AHU #3 Heat Reclaim no fai lure after SS176 hours
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Buildi ng S)'s tem Name lind ty pe h iluR Dlita
Nam e
CERR lM U#1 no failure afte r 79752 hours
CERR lMU#2 no failure afte r 79752 hours
CERR lM U#J one failure after 48984 hoursand
one fa ilure after 21528 hours
CERR l VU#1 failure after 35965 ho urs
CER R l VU#:! no failure after J7977 hours
CERR GVU#! no failure after 37977 hours
Based on (he abo ve find ings,
eta has been determin ed 10 equa l 6232 8.46. and
beta has been determ ined (0 eq ual 2A66 .
8.3.9 Failure orElectr ic/Pneumatic (EP) Relay
Three comm on modes o f failures for the EP relay are leaka ge of
com pn..ssed air. sole noid failure and the cracking of the plast ic housi ng. Since
sole noid failu re and the crack ing of the plast ic hou sing do not occur and are
ignored in this study, the reliability of this device is de termined so lely by the
quality o f com pressed air in terms of moisture and oi l. The qual ity o f co mpressed
air also depends on air filter. air dryer . PRY station compressor and air line. There
is on ly enough fail ure data to mood for EP leak ing fai lure mode.
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Table 8.13 Failurt Data ror EP Relays
Building System N. me . nd Type Fai lurt D.I.
Name
Arts/Ext AHU#I VAV no failure after 28900hours
Arts/Ext AHU# 2 VAV no failure after 28900 hours
Arts/Ext AHUN)Constant Volume no tuilure after 17200 hours
Biotechnology AHU#I VAV no failure after 55176 hours
Biotechnology AHU#2 Constant Volume no failure after 23688 hours
Biotechnology AHU.. 3 Heat Reclaim no failure after 55176 hours
('ERR L~IU# 1 no failure after 79752 hours
CERR LMU#2 failure after 46]20 hours
CERR LMU#J failure after 70512 hours
CERR LVUlH no failure after 37977 hours
CERR LVU#2 no failure after 37977 hours
CERR GVU;;!I no failure after 37977 hours
CERR Main compressed air supply 1.....0 failures both at 56088 hours
Based on the above findings,
eta hasbeen determined to equal 69366.52. and
betahas been determined to equal 3.037.
1':0 failure occurred for compressed air system in Biotechnology and
Arts/Ext. However. in CERR building the services required for:
Compressors after 51552 hours
., Airfilterafter69 192hours
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3. Air dryer afte r 70632 hours
Failure data analysis will ena ble maintenanc e personnel to identify the
weakest links in the sys tem This is reflecte d by failur e mode with a low value of
eta . The system reliability can be increased if there are means to increase the value
ofe ta. As this fail ure data ana lysis ap ply to the HVACsystem for three buildings at
~I UN. eta for Ian belts can be increased if the humidifies are installed away from
the fan. The maintenance personn el should use the mathematical mode l for
maintenance activi ties to ensure the components and the sys tems are maintained 10
their established reliabi lity requiremen ts based on previous ly supplie d scientific
data.
8.4 Mathematic al Model
The mathematical model for various com ponen ts is disc ussed in deta il in Chapter
5. Even though there are many failure modes which can happen 10a fan. only tan belts.
vortex vanes. ta n bearing. fan assembly . and fan motor failure had occurred during this
study . Bas ically all the system and subsys tem reliabilit y can bemodeled by para lle l
system . series sys tem. and the complex sys tem. The model for reliabili ty for the HVA,C
system R(tjS is as shown in equat ion 5.11.
Rlt)S R(tlFA N· R(t) AF· R(llCCS · R(tlFAD · R(tlCFP
• R(tl HSF • R(oCSF (5.11)
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where.
R(llS
R(t)Fan
R{t)A F
RUJCCS
R(t)FAD
R,, )CFP
R(t)HS F
R(1)CSF
wnere.
0< R(t)S <I
Reliability for the system
Reliability for the fan
Reliability tor air fi lter
Reliability tor the computer control system
Reliability tor fresh air damper
Reliability tor coil freeze protection system
Reliability tor Heating System
Reliability for Cooling System
There are many methods which may beused to optimize reliabi lity. H.L.
Resniko tT(1978) recommends partitioning the system into many subsystems. In the case
of HVAC systems. the subsystems consist o f fan. air filter. computer control system. fresh
air dampe r. coil freeze protection system. heatin&system. andcooling system ....-ith
com:spo nding equations shown in Chapter 5. If the fai lure modes assoc iated with each
subsystem can be minimized. then the subsystem reliability wi ll be increased. This wil l in
tum increase the reliability of the system and increase the availability of the system since
total reliability in this case is the product of all the subsystem reliabilit ies. Thi s
mathematical model method ology can beapp lied to any physical system. If there are no
previous failure data available for a specific system. then eta andbeta from a similar
149
system with similar operating conditio ns can beused . f ailure data can then be generated
using Monte Car lo method . Simulation software (e.g. Su~Smith) provides this
capabili ty. Th is model is based on Weibull distribu tion bUImode ls basedon no rmal
distribu tion. log normal distribution and maximum like lihood can be used. and aga in arc:
options with the sim ulation software. If thc cost of unplanned failure from a wear o ut
failure mode is greater than the COSI or a planned replaceme nt. there will be an optimal
interval. This is another option with simulatio n softwa re.
For exa mple. if the fa ilure data for fan belts as listed in Table C-S.3 wen: used as
input to the WinSm ith program of the Supers mnh Software and a distribu tion anal ysis
performed. the result o fthe analysis will beas follows:
T able 8.! '" Disl ribulio n An:lIysis (Regrn sion) (or r an Bells using 2
Pa rolmeier Weibull. J Parameter w ejbuu, lugS ormal.
and S o nn al DUlribulion
wcibutt [to = None ... 2 Paramete r)
Correla llon(rF.9792855 r"2....959 " c"2 ....8704 r"2-ecc" 2= .0886 (Okay)
Characteristic Value=204 6..1 Weibull SloP'="'2.147 Methoderr
Weibu ll [to ~ 1035.717 ... j Parameter] [Scale Not As Recorded)
Condation(r)=.9797959 r"2" .960 ccc" 2=.9364 r"2 -ecc" 2'" .0236 (Okay)
Characteristic v atuee 19681 Weibull Slope=1.9 11 \lethod~/tO"
Lo~Norm (to = None ... 2 Parameter]
Comlation(r)= .975 1922 r"2- .951 ccc"2= .8857 r"2-ecc"2 = .0653 (Okay)
Log-Mean Amil og""17124 Std. Dev. Factorzl.992 Method-rr
Nonn al+ [to =None ... 1 Parame ter]
COlTeimion(r)=.9848858 r"2'"'.970 ccc"2= .8857 r"2-ccc"1 "".0843 (Okay)
~kan= 1743 1 Std. Do:viation- 7890 Method-rr
Opti mum Distributio n: Weibutl (to = None ... 1 Parameter]
where .
CCCA2 = Square of Critical Corre lation Coefficient
The best distrib ution is the one with the 1:lTge5t posit ive diff erence. r"2 - CCCA 2.
This ana lysis indicated theWeibull Distribu tion with two parameter is the
optimum distribution for fa ilure data for fan belts. Howe ver . in some other case. log-
norma l or normal d istribution will bethe optimum distribu tion.
If the same failure data tor fan belts are used with the following conditions:
A. Analysis parameter Eta =2046-U . Beta =2 . 1 ~67
B. Block Replacement =No
C. View l ength units '" 10.000 Hrs.
D. Cost Each Planned Replacement tS) '" ISO
E. Cost Each Not Planned Replacement IS}" 500
Then the optimum replacement interval can bedetermined as fellows :
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Tabl e 8.15 Weibu ll Optim um Reptaeemeet Interval for Fan Bells
RESULTS
Eta =20464.3 Beta =2.1467
Date: MII ·DI2·YRI999
Cost " Item [$] Planned = 150 Cos t / Item (SI Not Planned = 500
At Optimum (1)333.33)Steady-State: Replacement Rate [!Unit-Units] =
5.034206E·05
Failure-Rate (FR ) (lUnil·Uni tsJ =2.465794E-05 MTBF(1/FR)=40554.89
C0stlT im~ [$/Units]:
Units Cost Units Cost Units COSI Units Cost
333.3 .4502 5333 .0323 10333 .02316 15333 .02272
666.7 .2254 5667 .03094 10667 .023 15667 .02278
1000 .1507 6000 .02976 11000 .02287 16000 02285
1333 .1134 6333 .02874 11333 02276 16333 .02192
1667 .091[4 6667 .02786 11667 .02268 16667 .013
20UO .07639 7000 .02708 12000 .02261 17000 .02309
2333 .06594 7333 .02641 12333 .02257 17333 .02317
2667 .05817 7667 .02582 12667 .02254 17667 .02326
3000 .05219 8000 .0253 13000 .02252 18000 .02336
3333 .04747 8333 .02485 13333· .02252 18333 .02345
3667 .04365 8667 .02446 13667 .02253 18667 .02355
4000 .04053 9000 .02411 14000 .02255 19000 .02365
4333 .03793 9333 .02382 14333 02258 19333 02375
4667 .03574 9667 .02356 14667 .02262 19667 .02385
5000 .03389 10000 .02334 15000 .02267 20000 .02395
Another example. if the failure data for tan Vortex Vanesas listed in Table C·S .5
were used as input to the WinSmith program of the Supersmitb Software and a
distribution analysis performed. the result of the analysis will be as fo llows:
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Table 8.16 DislribulioDAnalysis (RegrnsioD)For Vortex Vann
usioC2 Param d er Weibul l. J Param d er Weibull.
logNorm al. and Norma l Disl ribul ion
Weibull [to ""None ... 2 Param eter]
Correlatio n(r)=.9884331 r"2~.977 ccC"2=.8021 r"2-ccC"2- .1749 (Oka y)
Characteristic Value-68043 Weibull Slope=1.6 39 Method -rr
Weibull [to = ~1 5 5.506 ... 3 Param eter) [Scale Not As Recorded)
Currdalion(rF.9~893 88 r"2=.978 ccC"2=.899 r":!-ccc"2- .079 (Okay)
Character istic Value=tH5 14 Weibull Slope - U87 Method-rr/tO"
logNorm [to '" None ... 2 Parameter)
Corrclat ion(r)=.9767292 r"2"".954 ccc"2= .8t 17 r '2-ccc "2 - .1423 (Oka y)
log-Mean Antilog=50925 Std. Dev. Factor-2 .326 Mcthode rr
~urmal+ (10 = None ... 2 Parameter )
Cu rrelatiunlrl"' .98U 858 r"2= .1)70 ccC"2=.8117 r"::!-..:cc" 2= .1583 (Okay)
~lcan=573~ 1 Std. Deviation=30403 Method""rr
Optimum Distribution : Weibull [to - None ... :! Parameter]
where.
Correlat ion coefficie nt, usedto measure the strength of a
linear
relationship between two variable
CCC":! "" Square of 90% Crit ical Correla tion Cceffl ciem
The best distri but ion is the one ....'ith the largest positive diff erence . r"2 • CCC"::!.
In this case. two paramete r Weibu ll is the optimum distribu tion .
If the same failure data for fan belts are used with the followi ng condi tions :
A. Analy sis paramet er Eta - 6804 3. Beta « \.6 39
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B. Block Replacemen t = No
C. View Length units '" 60.000 Hrs.
D. COSI Each Planned Replacement (51 - 250
E. Cost Each Not Planned Replacement ($) "" 1000
Then the optimum rep lacemen t interval can bedetermined as follo ws:
Tab le 8.17 Weibu ll Opti mum Rcplaccmcntl ntcrval for vcrtes Vann
RESULTS
Eta = 68043.08 Beta - 1.638581
Date: M I I-D I2-YRI999
Cost l item [$J Planned > 250 Ccst z ttem [$J NOI Planned = 1000
At Optimum 1~8000) Steady-Sta te: Replacement Rate [/Uni l-UnitsJ '" 1.18.-643E·05
Failure-Rate IFR ) [!Un it-Units J - 8.9869 E-06 MTBF(1iFR) " 111273.1
Cost/T ime [Sil'nitsJ:
Units . . . COSI (lui1s Co st Units Cost Units ......Cost
1000 .25 1 16000 .020.57 31000 .0 15+4 ' 6000 .0 1 ~68
1000 .1264 17000 .0198] 32000 .0 1533 ' 7000 .0 1 ~68
3000 .08512 18000 .0192 33000 .0 1523 .-sOOO· .0 1467
' 000 .06461 19000 .0 1865 3'000 .01514 '9000 .01"67
5000 .052..2 20000 .01817 35000 .0 1506 50000 . 0 1 ~68
6000 .~37 2 1000 .0177'- 36000 .015 51000 .01"68
7000 .03868 2200 0 .0 1737 37000 .0 1..94 52000 .0 1469
8000 .03~"7 23000 .0\ 704 38000 .0 1488 53000 .0 1..7
9000 .03 12" 24000 .01675 39000 .0 1484 5' 000 .01..71
10000 .0287 25000 .0 1649 ' 0000 .0 148 55000 .0 \ 472
11000 .02665 26000 .0 1626 4 1000 .01477 56000 .01474
12000 .02497 27000 .0 1605 42000 .01474 57000 .01" 75
13000 .02358 28000 .0 \587 4]0 00 .01472 58000 .0 1477
14000 .022" 1 29000 .0157( 44000 .01471 59000 .01479
15000 .02 1" 1 30000 .01557 45000 .01469 60000 .01481
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The requ ired R(t)S various substan tially based on the type of occu pancy and the
intended use of the spac e served by the HVAC sys tem . For-example. the R(t)S fo r HVAC
sys tem used in for operating room in hospital will bevery high and will be low in normal
c tfice building . Further. the reliabili ty of the total system cann ot behigher than the value
o f the reliability of any subsystem. Thereliability o f lhe subsystem cannot be highe r than
tho:reliab ility of the failure modes within the subs ystem , The optimum replacement
interval to r individ ual failure mode is a functio n of planned replacement cost and
unplanned replacement cos t. The reliabili ty of the sys tem also can be influenc ed by the
geog raphicallocution where the sys tems are install ed, In Newfo undland. the requirement
for beatin g is long and the cooling requirem ent is lo w. This also has an im pact on
mai ntenance strateg y.
8.5 Knowledge-Based System
The knowled ge-based system de'veloped us ing intc rmction obtained by the RCM
method can address most of the faul ts encountered and is described in detai l in Chapter 6 ,
The informa tion obtained can beexp lained by fundamental enginee ring theory . In th is
case. temperature. humidity. pressure. flow rate, and vibration are the param eters in the
cxp...rt system usc-d to trace the cause o f fai lure . Based on the sy mptoms of these
parameters . troub le shooting can be performed . The outputs of this knowledge-based
sys tem 101" troubleshooting are listed in Tab le D- 6. 13 to Ta ble 0 -6.26 in Appendix D.
The da tabase system can beeas ily mod ified by addi ng additional records if additional
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failure mode encounters. It is easy to use and link the RCM worksheets and fault tree
figures by the built-in hypertext capability of the data base system, The failure data
obtained from this study can be used to predict the risk of fail ure for the compo nents of the
HVAC system based on the Weibull distribution . The developed knowledge-based system
proves that an expert system that reasons from first principles (i.e.• causal reasoni ng) and
requires specitl catic n of functionality of the componen ts to diagnose faults can be
developed without the use of a domain expert or "shallow rules" , This database system can
be used for troubleshooting and used to predict fai lure based on Weibull distribution . This
thesis uses HVAC system as a work example, However. such methodology can be applied
to any physical system . The main advantages are that it can be used for tra ining operators
and maintenance personnel. It quantities the predict ion of failure based on sound
engi neering approach instead of arbitrary assigned value from domain expert. Th is
de veloped expert system provides an integrated approach to response to failure.
8.6 RC FA
Root cause failure analys is can be applied 10 the fresh air intake louver. pre-tl Iter.
and fan belts to determine the root causes which are discussed in Section 8.1. Howe ver.
the failure of freeze protection. humidifier. heating system. and cooling syste m canno t be
determined because the failure data does not indicate which physical co mponents failed in
each case. A training program for the maintenance and operating personnel must be in
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place 10have the personne l trained to record information properly before ReFA can be
performed.
RCFA is in real time. It deals with todav's problems and eliminates them from
being tomorrow ' s problems . Bottom-line results can be immediate if recommendat ions
are acted on quickly . RCFA can beproactive wben accepted chronic failures that
comprise rhe maintenance bodget are eliminated from recurring . RCM coupled with
RCFA covers all the basesin moving towards total failure avoid ance.
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Chapter 9
9.1 Conclusion
Conclusions, Contributions and Findings
This thesis has presented a new. enhanced methodology for a knowledge-based
system develop ment wh ich integrates qualita tive and quan titative tools. This improved
sys tem bridges previous gaps in predict ing component s failure within a system. as well as
trouble shoot ing when failures occur. Previous methods relied upon input from experts.
which cannot be integrated with qualita tive and quan titative too ls as descri bed in this
thes is. The mood used here predicts component failures within a typ ical HVAC system.
but it en also beapptied genericall y to other system s.
The im proved database decis ion support syste m deve loped in this thes is integrat es
the fo llowi ng qualita tive and quantita tive ree ls:
• Qualita tive Tools: Reliabilit y Cent red Maintenance was combined with a
Fault Tree analysis to formulate a model (or the sys tem. Th is model is
based on the actual physics of the system. not on the experience and
knowledge o f experts as in classical expert systems. The rel iability model
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is used as the basis for the mathe matical model which hasbeen deve loped
to predict fai lures . The failure mode s associa ted with each component
failure are usedlISinputs for the database system.
• Quantitative Tools : Based un actual failure data anal yse . parameters to r
the Weibull distri bution can beestimated . The Weibu ll distri bution model
is then incorporated into the database system to es timate probabi lities of
failure .
By usin!: this improved datab ase decision suppo rt system. a ranki ng o f failur e
probab ilities can hi: de rived tor each of the failure mode s within any system . To
implement this sys tem. maintenanc e personnel mus t input data perta ining [0 failure mode s
into the mathematical model . Th is is requ ired to estimate the param eters lor a Weibull
Distribution. name ly las t replacem ent dates for each component .....ed dy hours of
ope ratio n. and the cu rrent da le. By using this informat ion. the math ema tical model. with
parameters estab lished from previous failure data. will provide a list o f probabilit ies lo r
the root causes when a failure occurs. based on the sym ptoms en tered into the computer.
This he lps narrow -down the causes of failure. shortens do wntime. and thereby increases
system availability. However. the estimation of parame ters for the Weibull distribu tion is a
basic problem that faces all new maintenance prog rams. Data specific to the sys tem at
hand have 10 be completed before the program can beeffective. This d ifficulty can be
circumvented by using similar data from similar si tuatio n elsewhere.
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Using Microsoft Access as a shell for the database decision support system, new
failure informat ion can readily beadded to the database. This allows for integrating new
info rmation into the expert system. without the need for extens ive comp uter programming.
The advantages of using Microso ft.Access are that it is a flexib le. high-quality program
whic h has widespread use.
9.2 Co nt r ib u tio ns
The developed database system is superio r to classical expert systems tor the
following reasons;
The Re M Tables A-3.2 to A-3.11 developed in the database system can be
used as a decision tool lor the optimized operations and maintenance
because it states the function. functionultailure. failure mode (cause of
failure) and failure effect s. This will help maintenance personnel 10 focus
on the impact of each failure mode and to determine a priority in
mainten ance strategy.
Fault Tree figures 84.3 to 8 -4.19 developed during the develo pment of
the database system provide a good visual picture for all technical
personnel. clearly showing the causes ofa particular failure. It provides a
clea r, concise visual outline of individual failures in a sub-system.
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.l . The acquired param ete rs for the Weibull distri butio n, based on the fail ure
data from threebuildings located at the Memorial University of
Newfo undland. can beused to predic t co mponent relia bility and failure .
These parameters are shown in Ta ble C·5 . l to Table C-5.13. These
parameters can beused to mod el simila r building s in similar geograp hical
location .
II has beenshO\..n thai the two param eter Weibull di stribu tion
model used in the de velop ing the da tabase sys tem is better than the three
paramet er. log-normal or norma l distribution. see Tab le 8.14 and Table
8.16.
This quant itative approac h. base d on ope rating hours . is more
scie ntific than the con fidence level establis hed by expe rts in conventional
ex pert sys tems and it prov ides a more reliable quant itative feedback to the
opera tors of the most likely causes of fai lure. Maintenanc e strategies can
then bedeve loped 10 meet the established reliability requirement for the
intended usage .
4 . The datab ase porti on o f the knowledge-based system enables us 10 retrieve
information easily and the built-in hyperlink capab ility enables us to l ink to
RC\-t Tables andFaullTree figures withoutany programming
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requ irem ents. This bui lt in function also enables us to rank failure
proba bilities withou t extensive prog ramm ing requirements. Most
main tenance departm ents in indusuy have the requ ired Access program or a
similar data base program installed. and can there fore:use the da tabase
system developed in th is way . The developed data base system can link
failu re modes at the root cause level based on certain symp toms as shown
in Table D-6. 13 to Tab le 0-6.25. It provides a suitab le too l fe r the
operator and/ or the maintena nce person nel to record the fai lure data at the
root cause level.
9.3 Findings derived Irum the MUN lI VAC case study
Problems repeated themselves without the root cause initially being
identified.
These incl uded :
prema ture failure of fan belts in the Earth Science Buildin g
failure cfthe pre- tiller in the Biotechn ology Building
fail ure o f the freeze protec tion components in the HVAC
systems in the Earth Science Building
These prob lems persis ted because the opera tors did no t address the
root cause s of the failures. but instead merely replaced failed components .
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., A subseq uent anal ysis of the failures dete rmined the root cause s to beas
10110",'5: In the case of premature failure of the fans. both humid ifiers were
located too dose 10 the fan. This is reflected in the Earth Resource Building
whe n the hum idifiers in the HVAC systems ta iled. which had the:effect o f
increasing the:life span of 13nbelts substantially . New system designs have
the humidifi ers moved further from the fan,
ln the case:of the pre-filter failures. one:root cause was determ ined
to be the location of the air intake louvers. ln this case. snow entered
through the louver and damaged the pre-fi lters. Further investi gation ofthe
air intake louvers showed their location is nOI in accordance: with good
ee glneerin g practice. In this study, the importance o f me lnlerlccauon and
its relations hip with pre-filter failures and the Ireeze protec tion system have
beenidentified.
tn the case of the failure of the freeze protection components in me
HVAC systems. me root causes were not determined. This is main ly due to
the fact that the failure data only recorded failure of freeze protection
instead of the fa ilure modes that cause:the fai lure. The probable causes are:
healing water tempera ture being too low; pump motor failure : pum p
impelle r failure: pump direct couplin g failure : or extremely low outdoor air
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temperature. Since the data failed [0 record at this level. the true cause was
not determined . There is a need to establish how failure data should be
record ed.
J . Modificatio n of a system may be required if managers are to determ ine the
roo t causes of fa ilure and address these causes. Modifica tion. with speci fic
uuenno n to these components. will improve the sys tem reliability. It was
clearly demons trated that if the humidifier was relocated to other sections
o f the system and away from the tan. then this would de finitely increase life
expectancy o f fan belts and improve system reliability.
-I, Maintenance perso nne l were aware of many ongoing maintenance
requirements with the HVAC sysrems. und responded by implementing.a
regular replacement schedule for the particu lar compon ents based on
Orig inal Equipm ent Manufacture (OEM) recommendations. For pre-filters.
the origin al replacement schedule was once every three mo nths based on
OE:'vlrecommendations. However. this was changed to once a year. and
since has been changed to once every six months. see Appendix H.
These policy changes were made with sketchy rationale for
preventive maintenance action. ln addition. no systematic analys is of the
failures was conducted, which may heve provided sou nd ratio nale for
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establishing a replacement schedu le. This resulted in unnec essary and
conservative preventive maintenanc e (PM), as related to pre-filter
replacement. Not all HVAC units need to be replaced according to the fixed
intervals recomme nded in OME guidelines. Instead. conditional
maintenance should be used. whereb y me liming of changes to com ponents
is determined using real-life data.
5. In this study. it was determined that the perimeter surrounding fresh air
intake louvers must becontrolled to ens ure no act ivities like garbage truck
loadin g or car exhaust will pollute qua lity of air Intake. Snow must be
co ntrolled to ensure that snow will nOIget into the HVAC equipmen t.
This example highlights nOI only pre · filter fai lure. but also
weak ness in the management system. ln this study. it was determined the
pre- filter had become clogged due to (ruck and car ex haus t entering the air
intake louvers .w"bieh resulted in a clogging of the pre-fi lters. The
developed expe rt system. as presented here. would have compelled
o perators 10 look for the root cause of the pre-filter failures because they
wou ld have rationale data at hand indicating the prob lem occurred not
becaus e of a failure of this component. but e lsewhere outside the
bound aries o f the HVAC syste m. Similarly. failure of the freeze protec tion
system.occurred when snow around air intake louvers.was not remo ved in
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a timely fashion. Thi s snow wou ld pile up around theair intake louve rs.
get suc ked into the HVAC system. and cause: damage.
6 . HVAC systems for this study are located in mechan ical room s and
remotely contro lled by computers. The total produc tive maintenance lTPMI
model can hard ly apply because thereis nocperaror on site.
lfthe above integrated app roach is applied to the practice o f
mainte nance. failure will be redu ced resul ting in increase d system
relia bility and availability.
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Chapter 10 Recommendations
This chapter presents the recommenda tions c fthis study with respect to the
ap plicat ion o f Reliab ility Centered Maintenance. Faull T ree Analysis, Mathemat ical
Madding, and Database Manage ment Systems to the develo pment of a data base decisi on
support system.
The recom mendations for addi tiona l areas of study are:
The Etfect o f Group Dynam ics and Team Approaches on the Main tenance
Process
This area hasreceived much attentio n from the plant ope ration
perspective . Howeve r. it has not experienced the same acceptance or
importance from the engineeri ng design/ ma intenance perspective. More
formalized methods for me use of team approac hes in desi gn/main tenance
processes needto bedeveloped.
In order 10 maximize the bene fits of the ReM . th is process shall be
perfo rmed by a group of system design engineers. system opera tors and
mainte nance personnel. This process is expensive and time cons uming and
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must have full suppon from top managemen t before it can proceed . The
team member s for the ReM process must be properl y trained before joining
the team.
The Data Gathering Process
Standardized data gathering processes need to be'develo ped . This
includes psycholo gical data (organizational culture. etc . j as well as
technical failu re data. Failure data collected should include parts (failed
compo nents). position (where were things at the time of failure).
documen tation (operating cond itions such as temperatures. pressures.
levels. etc. prior to . during. and after the incident). peop le (who were there.
where were they . and what did they Sloe. hear. fed. or sme ll prior 10 . during.
and after the incident"], and paradigm s (what are the cultural nonn s oft he
orga nizat ion. what do people accept as a way of doing busine ss. such as
commu nication between units or shifts. what repetit ive remarks were made
during the interview that indicate beliefs. values or deep-seated
convic tionsvj as per Broussard ( 1994).
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.I. The Feedback Process
The feed back loo p in theEnginee ring Design/Maintenan ce is weak
as viewedfrom an operating plant's perspec tive . This was very evide nt
from the system under study tor this thesi s. consi de ring that design
modifi ca tion was never cons idered tor failu res enco un tered duri ng the
period unde r study . Processes which improv e and ensu re feed bac k needto
bedeveloped. Fai lure data anal ysis must bestudied in deta il by designe rs as
a means of feedback for future design and sys tem modifications. In the
case o f HVAC sys tems. if the location of fresh air louve rs and inle t
con d itions arc studied further and the syste m modi fied to correct the causes.
this will minimize air filter fai lure. sys tem sh ut down due to the activa tion
of the freeze pro tect ion syst em. and improve indoo r air qua lity . Thecurre nt
prac tice that the fan section co ntains the moto r and the humidifi er.
definitely dec reases life expectancy and lo wers sys tem reliability . It is
recom mended tha t in future des igns . the hum idifier shal l be loca ted down
stream of the supply fan instead o f up stream . The fa ilure data lor the
heating coi l and the coo ling coil is based on the cen tra l system wi th good
ma intenance personn el. Heat ing and coo ling with an indiv idua lized
sys tem should bestudied and compare d with the central system. Electric
humidifi er failure data for Biotechnolo gy build ing are not accurat e and new
data should beobtained from new buildings,
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Conduio n Based Maintenance
Condition Based Maintenance should beused in monito ring system
co mponents such 3S filters in the HVAC sys tem. The cond ition shall be
logged [ 0 establish thepoten tial failure point and the inspection interval.
The presen t schedu led maintenance method for pre-air filter and air filte rs
m ust bemodified . New fail ure data to r pre-air filters and air fi lters must be
obtained in order to achieve meanin gful parame ters for tile Weibull
d istribution. The prese nt practice cfletung pressure drop through the filter s
to 25 rom before replacement shall be re-evaluated to ensure good q uality
air supply.
5. New Param eters and Longi tudinal Stud ies
The data collect ed for this study was very speci fic to a give n site.
and lo r a set time period. Theeffect o f the vari ability o fo ther parameters.
such 3S location. designers . manufac turers and availa ble techno logy can be
studied with a larger database coverin g a longer time period. Failure data
tor the HVACsystem located within CERR. Biotechnology and
Arts/Exte nsio n should becollected and analyzed for the next ten years in
order to obtain the additional life cycle data of the HVAC system . Furthe r,
add itional fa ilure modes encoun tered should be used to update the fault
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trees. the ReM workshee t. the mathemati cal mode ls. and the expert system.
This study is based on theassumpcion that thereis no difference between
designers.equ ipme nt manufacturersor the technology at the time.
However . if failure data for buildings with the same des igner is available
then data shou ld beanalyzed to see whether there is a diffe rence between
desig ners. Also. failure data from the same equipment manufacturer shou ld
hi: analyzed to identify whether there is a difference between equip ment
from different manu facturers . During differ ent periods in histo ry. des igners
u~ ing di fferent technolog ies. Failure data should therefore be grouped
based on the time of construction to idc:ntif)' that there is a difference in the
parameters obta ined for the Weibull analysis.
6. Mathematical Mode ls
Systemat ic method must be establish ed to determine cost for
planned maintenance and unplanned maintenance. This can beachieved by
using the work des ign andmaterial handling approaches that are presently
used by the indus trial engineers . There an: many distribution (unctions that
can be used in model ing for system fail ure. Weibull distri bution is used in
this case. However . failure data for each failure mode must beanalyzed to
determin e which distri bution is the most appro priate functio n and the
associated param eters for that particular failure mode. At presen t. the
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mathematic al models do not include weather condit ions which can be
included in the models. The present mode ls are based on the users having
the weather conditions before using the expert system.
7. Database Systems
There are many macro functions in the database system which can
be:used to enhance the reponi ng requirement for users. The queries and
reports should be modified to the requ ired format for the end users .
Further development work can take place on the use of commercial. low
cost. database systems tor knowledge-based sys tem deve lopment. A
generic shell. similar to how MS Project is based on MS Access for project
management. can be developed tor maintenance operations.
8. Scope ofSiudy Area (RCFA)
Root Cause Failure Analysis must beused to deal with each. failure
mode. ln the HVAC system. a lot of causes of failure can be minimized if
the maintenance scope is extended outside the air intake louver. which is
the conventional starting point for HVAC system operators and
maintenanc e personnel. By controlling the intake conditions. the system
reliability can be increased.
[72
In order to complete the expert system for the HVAC system. the
scope of study should beexpanded to the source cf thecooling system and
source of hearingsystem. In jhecasefor MUN. this will bea study for the
cooling tower and high temperaturehearing plants located in the Utility
Failure data for non-electric humidifiers should becollected and
compared with failure data for electric humidifiers.
9. Training
The recommendations for alternative approaches to the researchare
listed as fellows:the data presented by Honeywell Inc. is at the problem
identification level. In order tc optimize the mathematical model. more J ata
should be recorded at the root cause level. a level lower than the problem
level. This confirms that more education and training is required tor
operation and maintenance personnel.
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Appendix B: Fault Tree Analysis
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Appendix C: Weibull Analysis for Components
23t
Table C - S. I Rank Table · Fresh Air Dampu · Failu re Analysis
TITLE: Fresh Air Damper- Failure Analysis
BUILDING ~A~IES : Biotechnology. CERR and AnslExt.
Rank Table:
Poml \ - \ J.IUl:
""'"
\Icdi.1l\R3nk
I · 11028 $Uspenslon
,
·26135 suspenSlun
) 27326 \.1 538'-6 0,05929-487
, 2894.- 2.}07692 0,1394231
,
. )0-4&1 suspensrun
,
·30-48 1 suspension
7 ·)0 912 suspension
. 3-46&0 3.&9-42J I 0.2-49599-1
.
·3US '- suspens'Ull
10 ·383S'- wspcnSIOl\
"
-1586-1 suspenSion
"
"%3 2 6.670673 O.~1"O79
I)
·5S080 5IIspcnslUll
l ' _suW wspcns....n
c.L: Weibull
shape factor: beta = 3.853321
I ~ pts.rotal tususps. W1rr(W.:ibull analysis using least square
method)
correlatio n It) :: .9263473. ccc ...:i92398I (OK). r- r=.8581192
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Table C - 5.2 f(f) and R(I) Pred jcnen Table - Fresh Air Damper
TITLE: Fresh Air Dampe r - Failure Analysis
BUILDI:-JG NA~1 ES : Biotechnology. CERRand AnsIE:<t.
Prediction for beta =3.853321. eta = 51996.59
[Confidence = 50.()()()()OIo}
Hours ofOperatlon FlI) in l!/, R(t) in 0/0100'%
1000 0.00002 99 .99998
1500 0.000 12 99 .99988
2000 0.00035 99 .99965
1500 0.00083 99.99 9 17
3000 0.00 168 99.998j2
. 000 U.0051 1J9 .9949
5000 0.0 1205 99.98795
6000 0.02·B3 99.91567
7000 0.04407 99.95593
8000 0.07371 99.92619
9000 0.11602 99.88398
10\l00 0.17408 99 .82592
11000 0.25 123 99 .74811
12000 0.35 113 99 .64 887
13000 OA1168 99.52232
\4000 0.63501 99 .36494
15000 0.81766 99.17134
20000 2A8672 99.5 1328
25000 5.776 35 1J4.21365
234
Hours of Operation F(t)in % R(l) in %100%
30000 11.31873 88.68127
35000 19.55242 80.44758
. 0000 30.50786 69,49214
45000 43.617 56.383
50000 57.68181 42.31819
235
Table C · 5.3 RlInk Teb te - FIID Belts Failure Analysis
TITLE: Fan Belts Fail ure Ana lysis
BU ILDING NAMES : Biotechnology, Arts/Ex t. and CE RR.
Rank Table :
Point x-va tue Order Median Rank
1 -483-1 suspension
, 4896 1.045455 0.03327922
) 5703 2.090909 0.07995129
, 6385 3.136364 0. 1266234
; -8472 suspensio n
s 9864 4.239899 0.1758883
7 - 10583 suspension
, 11505 5.4 1:405 0.22823:4
9 -12342 suspens ion
to -12744 suspension
II -1) 032 suspension
11 134 16 6.878038 0.2936614
II -13872 suspe nsion
"
15552 SA9023 4 0.365 6355
I; 15792 10. 1024) 0.43 76085
rs 17197 11.71463 0.509 5815
17 - 17395 suspens ion
IS 18960 13.59552 0.59)550 1
19 -20880 suspensio n
,
-22605 suspens ion
"
23328 16.730 35 0.7334977
'"
-) ] 144 suspension
236
cl .: W~ibull ~la -20464.3
shape factor; beta = 2.l ~67
22 plS. IOlal l l susps. W/rr
corre lar icn ( r) - .9797708. ccc - .9323768
(O,K).r-r- .<J599508
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Table C · S." F(I) and R(I) Pr editlion - Fan Bell
T[TLE : Fan Belts Failure Analysis
BUILDING NAMES; Biotech nology, Arts/Ext. and CERR.
Prediction lor beta '" 2.[ 467. eta = 20464.3
[Confidence = 50.0000%1
Hours otOperarion F(I) FB in % R(t) FB in%
(100 - ro»
1000 0.15 99.85
1500 0.31 99 .63
'::000 0.68 99.32
2500 1.09 98.9 1
}OUO 1.61 98.39
4000 2.96 97.04
5000 4.74 95.26
6000 6.93 93.07
7000 9.51 90..19
8000 12.47 87.53
<'1000 15.76 84.2-1
10000 19.34 80.66
11000 23. 19 76.8 !
12000 27.24 72.76
13UOO 31.45 68.55
14000 35.77 M .23
15000 40.15 59.85
:20000 61.4 38.6
25000 78.5 21.5
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Hoursof Operation F(t)FBin % R(l) FB in %
(I00-F(t))
30000 89.7 10.3
35000 95.78 4.22
. 0000 98.52 1.48
-15000 99.56 0...
50000 98.89 0.11
55000 99.98 0.02
Table C · 5.S Rank Tabl~ - Vones Vanes . Failure Ana lysis
TITlE: Vortex Vanes - Failure Analysis
BUILDINGNAMES: Biotechnology. CERRand An~XI .
Rank Table:
Point x-value Order Mro ian
Rank
I 12936 I 0.061-1035
,
· 20] 52 suspension
3 -20520 scspenslcn
, 21888 2.222212 0.1686 16
s -28990 suspension
6 -28990 suspension
7 -] 7977 suspension
8 -37977 suspension
9 ·37977 suspension
10 59232 5-181-182 0.-15-15159
11 7-1856 8.7-10'-11 0.7-10-11 59
c. i .: Weibull eta = 680-13.0S
shape factor: beta = 1.638581
I I pts. total 7 susps. W/rr
correlation (r) = .9886051. ccc > .892398 1(OK). r·r= .977H
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Ta ble C · 5.6 f (t) and R(I) Predicti on Table - v err ex Vanes
TITLE: Vertex Vanes • Failure Analysis
BUILDING NAMES: Biotechnology. CERRand Arts!Ext.
Prediction for beta = 1.63858 [, eta = 68043.08
[Confidence = 50.0000"/<I}
Hours otO perarion F(t) FVV in % R(t) FVV in%
( 100. rro
100U 0.01 99.9
1500 0.19 99.81
2000 0.31 99.69
2500 0,44 99.56
3UOO 0.6 99A
4000 0.96 99.04
5000 1.38 98.62
6000 1.85 98.[ 5
7000 2.38 97.62
8000 2.95 97.05
9000 3.57 96.4)
[0000 4.23 95.77
[ 1000 4.92 95.08
[2000 5.66 94.34
[3000 6.42 93.58
[4000 7.22 92.78
15 .000 8.05 91.95
20000 12.58 87.42
25000 17.62 82.38
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Hours of Operation F(t) fVV in % Rt t) FVVin %
( IOO . ro»
30000 23 77
35000 28.56 71.44
. 0000 34 .21 65 .79
45000 39.82 60 .18
50000 45.3 1 54.69
55000 50.62 49.38
2"
Table C - 5.1 RaokTable · Fan Bearin g . f ailure Analysis
TITLE : Fan Bearin g - Failure Analysi s
BUILDI~G NA:\ tES : Biotechnology . CERR and ArtS/Ext.
Rank Tabk::
Point x-value Order Median
Rank
1 · 17200 suspension
2 -28900 suspension
3 -28900 suspension
• 31272 1.3 0.0806452
s -37977 suspension
6 -37977 suspensio n
7 -37977 suspens ion
,
·55176 suspe nsion
• -55176 suspe nsion
10 75528 ~ _~25 0.3165323
II -79752 suspension
12 ·79752 suspensice
c.L: w eibutt 1:'13'" 132780.2
shape factor: beta e 1.712307
12 pe. rcer to susps.Wlrr
co rre lation Ir):: L ccc "' .99999 (OK ). r*r- I
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Ta ble C - S.8 F(I) and R(t) Predif:lioQ . Fan Bearing
TITL E: Fan Bearing- Failure Analysis
BUILDING NAMES: Biotec hnolo gy. Am/Ext. and CERR.
Prediction lor beta .. 1.712307. eta " 132.780.2
[Confidence = 50.0000% ]
HoursofOperation F(t) FBG in% R(t) FBGin%
(10 0 . ro»
1000 0.Q2 99 .85
1500 0.05 99 .95
2000 0.08 99 .92
2500 0.11 99 .89
3000 1.15 99 .85
4000 0.25 99. 75
5000 0.) 6 99.64
6000 0.5 99.5
7000 0.65 99.35
8000 0.8 1 99.19
9000 0.99 99.01
10000 1.19 98.81
I IOUO 1.-1 98.6
1:2000 1.62 98.38
13000 1.85 98.15
1.:.1000 2.1 97.9
15000 2.36 97.64
20000 3.84 96. 16
25000 5.57 94.43
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Ilours of Operation F(t) FBG i n ~. R( I) FBG in %
(100 . F(I))
30000 7.53 92.47
35000 9.69 90.31
. 0000 12.03 87.97
~5lXlO 1 ~.51 85.49
;0000 17.12 82.88
55000 1 9 . 9~ 80.16
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Table C • 5.9 Rank Tabl~ - ra n As5~mbly railu r~ Analysis
TITLE: Fan Assembly ~ Failwe Analysis
BL' ILDI~G NA~ES: Biotechnology. CERR and Am/Ext.
R3nk Tabk:
Point x.vetue Order Median
Rank
1 -rn eo suspension
2 ·28900 suspension
J ·:!8900 suspension
, 35% 5 1.3 0.0806452
; ·3 7(}77 suspension
b ·3 7977 suspension
7 ·55176 suspensio n
8 · 55176 suspensio n
• -55176 suspensio n
10 75528 4 .~25 0.3165323
II ·7975 2 suspens ion
12 ·79752 suspensio n
c t.: WeIbull ela -12 1417.-1
shape (actor. beta '= 2.03499
12 p IS. total 10 susps. W/rr
correlatio n (rl '=. 1. ccc '= .99999 IO .K) r·r '= 1
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Table C - 5.10 F(t) and R(t) Pred tencn - FanAssembly
Fan Assembly. Failure Analysis
BUILDlt\G NAMES; Biotechnology. CERR and Arts/Ext.
Prediction to r beta = :!.035. eta = 1:!1417A
[Confidence = 50~u l
Hours of Operation F{t) FA in % R{t) FA in %
100%
1000 0.0 1 99 .99
1500 0.01 99.99
:!OOO 0.02 99.98
2500 0.04 99 .96
3000 0.05 99 .95
.000 0. \ 99 .9
5000 0.15 99 .85
6000 0.22 99 .78
7000 0.3 99.7
'000 OA 99.6
9000 0.5 99. 5
ioooo 0.62 99.38
11000 0.75 99.25
12000 0.9 99.1
13000 \.05 98.95
I ~OOO 1.22 98.78
15000 1.4 1 98 .59
20000 2.52 97,48
25000 3.93 96.07
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Hours of Operation F(t) FA i n ~' R(t)FAin %
100%
30000 5_65 94.35
35000 7.65 92.35
-I000O 9.91 90.09
45000 12.~2 87.58
50000 15.16 84.g~
55000 18.09 8 1.9 1
60000 2l.2 78.8
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Table C · 5.11 Rank Table · Fan Motor Failure Analysis
TITLE: Fan MOlOrFailure Ana lysis
BUILDING NAMES: Biotechnolog y. CERR and Arts/Ext.
Rank Tab!.::
Point x-value Order Median Rank
1 -17200 suspension
, 21528 1.071429 0.05357 143
J 22800 2.142857 0.1279762
• -28990 suspension
5 ·28990 suspension
6 -32376 suspension
7 35965 3.57 1429 0.227 1825
8 -37977 suspension
9 -37977 suspe nsion
10 ~8984 5.-176 191 0.3 59~577
II -55176 suspension
I , -55176 suspension
IJ -79752 suspension
14 -79752 suspensio n
c.L: Weibull eta - 62328.46
shape factor: bela = 2.466204
14 pis. total 10 susps . W/rr
correlation (r) = .93209 17. ccc '" .8923981 (OK). rf'r-.8687949
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Tabl e C - 5.12 F(t) lind R(I) Predictio n
TITLE: Fan Motor - Failure Analysis
BUILDING NAMES: Biotechnology, CERR and Arts/lixr.
Prediction tor beta = 1A66104. eta = 62328.46
[Confidence = 50.0000%J
Hours of Opera lion F (I) FM in % R(tl FM in %
{IOO -F (l))
1000 0.01 99.99
1500 0.01 99.99
2000 0.02 99.98
2500 0.04 99.96
3000 0.06 99.94
..WOO 0.11 99.89
5000 0.2 99.8
6000 0.31 99 .69
7000 OA6 99.54
8000 0.63 99.37
90UO 0.84 99 .16
10000 1.09 98 .91
tlOOO U 8 98.62
12000 L7 98.3
13000 2.07 97.93
I·JOOO ZA8 97.52
15000 .Z .9~ 97.06
20000 5.88 94.[2
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Hours or Operation F (t) FM in';' R(t)FM in 'l.
( 100 - F(.))
25000 9.98 90.02
soooo 15.19 84.81
j 5000 21...U 78.59
-1000O 28.46 71.5..l
"51100 j 6.09 6j .91
50000 44.05 55.95
60000 59.76 ..lO.24
ToabllrC· 5.U R(t) Pndidion Tab llr· f an Rdiability
Prediction lor bela - 2.1467. eta e 20464.3 for fan belts
Predict ion lor bela '" 1.63858. eta = 68043.08 lor Fan vcnex Vanes
Predic tion fo r beta - 2...166204. eta =62328.46 for Fan malar
Predictio n lin beta - 2.035. eta = 121"'17...1 for Fan assembly
Prediction tor beta - 1.712307. eta =132780.2 lo r Fan Bearing
[Confidcnce w 50.0000%1
Hours of R(t ) R(ll R(I) Rlll R{I) R{l) FA N
Operation FB FVV FM FA FBG
\000 0.9985 0.999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9998 0.997 10254927
1500 0.9963 0.998 0.9999 U.I}W} 0.11995 0.99361149..H9
2000 0.993~ 0.997 0.9998 0.9996 0.9992 0.9888)4 6-l59
2500 U.'l891 0.996 0.9996 0.9996 0.9989 0.98327285154
3000 0.9839 0.99-1 0.999 0.9995 0.9985 0.97545571549
.000 0.97Q.1 0.990" 0.999 0.999 0.9975 0.9567651N538
;000 0.9526 0.9862 0.998 0.998; 0.9964 0.93279864109
6000 0.9307 0.9815 0.991 0.9978 0.995 0.9Q.II94282"'6
7000 0.9049 0.9762 0.995 0.997 0.993; 0.81061371021
8000 0.8753 0.9705 0.994 0.9961 0.9919 0.83"'27587078
9000 0.8"'24 0.9643 0.992 0.99; 0.9901 0.7938607650"'
10000 0.8066 0.9577 0.989 0.9938 0.9881 0.75021179577
11000 U.1681 0.9508 0.986 0.9925 0.986 0.70467892555
12000 0.7276 0.9434 0.983 0.991 0.9838 0.65784344692
13000 0.6855 0.9358 0.979 0.9895 0.9815 0.60992901576
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Hours of R(ll R(ll R(ll R(I) R(ll R(I) FAN
Operation FB FVV FM FA FBG
1. 000 0.6423 0.9278 0.975 0.9877 0.979 0.56182964 552
15000 0.5985 0.9195 0.971 0.9859 0.9764 0.51439383577
l OOOO 0.386 0.87U 0.9·U 0.9748 0.%16 0.29764439 277
25000 0.2 15 0.8238 0.9 0.9607 0.9443 0.1446107363
30000 0.129 0.77 0.848 0.9435 0.9247 0.0734884436
35000 0.0045 0.7144 0.786 0.9235 0.9031 0.002I07·H 1
. 0000 0.(XH6 0.6579 0.7 154 0.9009 0.8797 0.000 59682
45000 0.0006 0.60 18 0.639 0.8758 0.8549 0.000 17:!75
; 0000 0.0002 0.5469 0.56 0.8484 0.8288 O.COOO·HI
55000 0.0000 0.4938 0.4797 0.819 1 0.80 16 0
258
Teble C - 5.14 Rank Table - [ P Relay - Failure Analysis
TITL E: EP Relay Failure Analysis
BUILOlNG NAMES: Biotechnology. CERR and Arts/Ext.
Rank Table :
Point x-value Order Median Rank
I ·17200 suspens ion
, ~ 3688 U lb6667 0.(}.I97Sl 55
3 · 28900 suspension
,
-28900 suspension
s ·34488 suspension
6 .) 7977 suspension
7 ·37977 suspension
a -)7977 suspension
9 46320 ~ , 9 3n33 0.17 0995 7
IU -; ;1 16 suspension
"
·;51 76 suspension
12 560 88 5,546661 0 .3406926
13 56088 8.16 0.5 103896
"
705 12 10.773jJ 0 ,6800 866
"
·191 52 suspension
c.t. : W~ibul[ eta v 69366.52
shape factor: beta : 3.036842
15 pes. eotal lO susps. W/rr
correlation (r) = .965255. ccc = .9021535 (OK). r·r=.93 17172
259
t
"l
~ " " ~ s~ tn ~~ s s 2 tn~
C U U::::l IX IX Iol% U Iol
~~
I
t'
.~ .
~
· -<
· ~] ;:
; .
·
"0: "~
.2
c,
~
..
c
~
.,;
o
~;,;:
~ ~
~
Tab le C - 5.15 F(f) ..nd R(t) Predi ct ion Ta ble · EP Relay
TITLE: EP Relay • Failure Analysis
BUllDIt-;ONAMES: Biotechnology, (ERR and AnslExt.
Prediction tor beu • 3.037.eta :: 69366.52
[Confidence = 50.()()()()o/,,)
Hours o f Operation F(t)in % R<t) in %
100%
1000 0.0003 99.9997
1500 0.0009 99.9991
:2000 0.0021 99.9979
2500 o.oo-z 99.9958
3000 0.0072 99.9928
' 000 0.0173 99.9827
5000 0.03~ 99.966
6000 0.059\ 99.9~09
7000 0.0944 99.9056
8000 0.1416 99.858'
9000 O .202~ 99.7976
10000 0.2186 99.7214
11000 0.3719 99.6281
12000 0.4841 99.5159
13000 0.6169 99.3831
14000 0.7721 99.2279
15000 0.9511 99.0489
20000 2.2635 91.1365
261
Hours cf'Operauon F(t)in % R(t) in %
100%
25000 4.4085 95.5915
30000 7 .5~37 92.4563
35000 11.7732 88.2268
"0000 17.1301 82.8699
"5000 :n .5626 76.437~
50000 30.9278 69.0722
55000 38.9957 61.0043
262
Appendix D: Knowledge-Based System
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Using the Mic rosoft Access program unde r a new table desi gn :
Ia} enter "componerunume" in Field Name. selec t "Text" in Data
Type. and enter "component failure mode" in the Description .
(bl ente r " RD"i n the Field Name , select Data/Time in Data Type . and
enter " lew replacement date" in the Descri ption .
~": I enter "CD " in the Field Name. sele ct Data/Time in Data Type. and
enter "current dare" in Description.
IJ I enter " Duration- in the Field Xame. selec t "N umbe r" in tru:- Data
Type . and enter -the dura tion in days between RD and CO .- in the
Descri pt ion. Using DaleD inr d".(R D).[CD J) as "Duration"
I.:) enter " HRS' in the field Ncrne. select "N umbe r" in Data Type. and
enter " Hou rs of operaucn per week" in the Description.
(n enter "C' in the fi eld Name. select "N umber' in Data Type. and
enter 'l ime in hours ofope rauon" in the Descript ion ,
- Duration·-n·"HRS-
cgl enter -beta" in the Field Name . select "Number" in DataType. and
enter -beta " in the Desc ription. To fermat the beta co lumn . righ t
cl ick on the colum n t in Ihe I fl.'.l igll vievr . d ick on properties. cl ick
in the format field and choo se " fix ed" , Also chan ge the Decimal
places to 5.
{hI entert'etc" in the Field Name. select "Number" in Data Type. and
enter "eta" in the Descrip tion. To fo rma t the eta co lumn. righ t
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dick on the column (in the design ,·jew). click on pro perties. dick
in the format field and choose " fixed". Also change me Decima l
plcces tc s.
ti ) en ler-F(t)~ in me Field Name. select " Number" in the Data Type.
and enter " r" proba bility offailure in me Description. To format
the F(tl column. right dick on the:column ( in the design view) .
click on properties, dick in the (annat field and choose "fixed".
Also change the Decimal places 10 5.
Using Mia osoli program access under a new query design :
tj ) Since " C is equa l 10 (Duration J· (HRS/WK ]I7. then the exp ressio n
- :(DUt3tion j· [HRSiWK)f7" is added in the field after -r -.
(k l Since - F(t)" is equa l to I-eXp'·I' • ('1,'1
Therefo re. in the field a fter -Fn)" add ":" to stan expression. Type ' I·
(exp(- I ·(l (t¥ (etalY'(bctaUW. Th is can beachieved many ....nys. We can type in
the expressio n or usc: expression Builder. Under Function d ick Built-in Functions
and select '·EXp.. then Click - Paster tc add the functions. After the com plete
expression is completed then we can run the program. Under the F(t) column.
right click and select "descend ing". the outpu t is a list ofp robability of failu re
mode in des cending order to highlight the results
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Appendix E: Biotechnolog y Building Information
280
Biotechnol ogy Building stan ed functioning on Apri l 1992
Equipment : The building is served by three air hand ling units and are listed as fel lows :
AHU#I Variable Volu me System
The pre-filter sect ion cons ists (If 15 24x2-h:2 and 12 12x24x2 pleated filter.
The filter sec tion consists of 15 24x 24x4 and three 12x24x4 pleated filter.
Su pply ta n moto r size is 75HP with four 5V900 type of belt size with running speed at"?
Rpm.
AHUIQ Constant Volume Terminal Reheat System
The pre-filler sectio n consists cfthree 24x24:<2 and fou r 12x24x2 pleated filter.
The filter section co nsists of three 24x24x4 and four 12x24x4 pleated filter .
Supply ta n motor size is 20 hp with six BX38 type bel t size with running speed at ?'! rpm
AHU=) Heat Recla im System
The pre-tit ter section consists of2 8 16x25x2 M4 7 type filter .
The exhaust Ia n motor size is 30HP with six 3V50 0 belt size with runni ng speed at '?rpm.
Interlocked with Exha usted fan #14 & IS.
Operating conditioning: After the build ing was built. it was under warrant y for one
year and the maintenance will cut in after the warran ty
period. The systems are in operation 24 hours a day .
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Appen dix F: Arts a nd Adminislra tion Extension Build ing
Information
282
Arts & Adminis tration Building Extensio n started functioning on April 1992
Equipment: This building is served by threeair handling unitsandare lis ted as
follows:
AHU=I IUO"·oFreshAi r Variable Volume System with So Return Air
The pre-filter section consists 01"9- 24x.2·h :! M47 filter.
Tile:filter sec tion consists 01"924x24 x2 pleated Dry-Pack type tiller.
Supply fan motor is 25 hp with 2·B112 type of belt running at 30 rps.
Return fan moto r is 15 hp with 2-BX108 type: ofbeltand running at 30 rps.
AHU#:! Mixed Air Variable Volume System
The:pre-filter section consists of().. 24x2 ·h2 Pleated till er.
The:filter section consists 01'6 24x24 x2 pleated Dry-Peck type filter.
Sup ply fan motor is IS hp with 2-BS5IY~ of belt running .1 30 rps.
Return fan motor is 5 hp with 1-8 .-\75 type ofbelt and running at 30 rps.
AH U#] 100010Constant Vo lume to Serve the Cafeteria Area
The pre-filter section consists of 4· 2.:h24x2 Pleated filter.
The:filter section consists of 6 2.:h24 x2 pleated Dry-Pack type filter.
Supply Ian mawr is 7.5 hp with 1-879 type o fbelt running at ?? rpm.
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Operating schedule tor AHUNI and AHU#2 is 88.5 hours per week
Schedule
Day PennStan Perm Stop
Sunday 99:99 99;9Q
Monday 07,00 23:00
Tuesday 07,00 ~ 3:00
Wednesday 07,00 23:00
Thursday 07:00 ~J :OO
Friday 07,00 , ) ,00
Salurd:!.y 08:30 17,00
Holiday 99:99 ~:'19
Operating schedule for AHU#3 is 52.5 hours per week .
Schedule
Day Perm Start Perm Stop
Sunday 99:99 99:99
Mo nday 07:30 18:00
Tuesday 07,)0 18:00
Wednesday 07:30 18:00
Thursday 07:30 18:00
Friday 07:30 18:00
Saturday 99:99 99:'N
Holiday 99,9 9 99:99
Notes:
99 :99 means shut down
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Appendix G: Earth Resource (CERR ) Building Informal ion
286
Earth Resou rce lC ERR) Building started functioning on Septem ber 1989
Eq uipment: This buildin g is served by six air handling units Lab Ventilat ion units
l VUI . LVU2. Lab Make up units LMUI . LMU2.LMUJ and a General
Ventila tion unit
LMU# I Laboratory Make Up Air Handling Uni t
The pre-filter sect ion consists of 10- 24x24x2 and 5- 12x2~x2 M~7 tiller ,
The tiller sect ion cons ists of 10- H xNx l8 Bag Dry-Pack type fiher.
Supply tan motor is ~O hp with 5-B98 type o f belt .
LMU#2 l aboratory Make Up Air Hand ling Unit
The pre-filter section consists of 10- 2~x24x2 and 5· 12x24.'(2M~7 filter.
The tiller sec tion consists o rto- 2~xl~xI 8 and 5- l2x2~dg Bag Dry-Pack Type fi lter.
Supp ly Ian motor is ~O hp with 5-B98 type of belt.
LMU#3 Labora tory Make Up Air Handli ng Unit
Ihe pre-tiller section consists of 12· 20x25.'(2~147 litter.
The supply tan is 7.5 hp wit h I-B6Otype of bell.
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LVUi;!I Laboratory Ventilation Unit
The:pre-ti tter section co nsists of 10-24x24'(2 and 5- 12x2·h2 Mol7 filter .
The fi lter secuon consists of I().. 24'(24'(\8 and 5- 12x2-1:<18 Bag Dry-Pa ck type filter.
Supply fan motor is 50 hp with 3-5 V950 type o f belt .
LVL;i;!:! Laboratory Ventilation Unit
The pre-filter section consists of 10- 24x24.'(2 and 5- 12x24'(2 M47 filter.
The filter section co nsis ts of \ 0- 24x2·hI8 and 5- 12'(24'(18 Bag Dry-P ack type filter .
Supply fan moto r is 50 hp with 3-5V9S0 type o f bel t.
GVU#\ General ventila tion Unit
The:su pply tan motor is 50 hp with j -5V9 50 type cfbelt.
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Units LMU I. LMU2 and LMUJ are runnin g 24 hour s a day .
Operating sched ule tor Units GVU l and LVUI and LVU2 . i.~.gO hours per week
Schedule
Day Perm Start Perm Stop
Sunday 99:99 99 :99
Monday 07;00 23:00
Tue sday 07;00 23:00
Wednesday 07;00 23;00
Thu rsday 07;00 23:uO
Friday 07:00 23:00
Sat urday 99:99 99:99
Holiday 99:99 99 :99
No tes:
99:99 means shu t down .
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Appendix H: Existing Practice for the Arts/Ext,
Biotechnology and CERR Buildings
290
Equi pm~at li5t ~taiatu.... ee Sdl~ .I~ :\Iel hod
Fresh 3ir intake louver No manuenance
Fresh 3ir dampe r mOlor lubrica redeveryJ month Schedu led
Pre-fi lter It was once every J month Ihen it Scheduled
";1$ changed io once t:\o'e~ ye ae.
Cu rrenl peecnce is change once eveey
six rnor uhs.
Filter cece a \ O:M II was set up as on-
conditio n method of
main tenance beca use
the press ure drop
through the filter was
moni tcred.But the
. ell ine:was,:>\:laI15
mm. ;;.clling thal\\ a.
too high and will nOI
exis t with in one year .
Hcanug Cc nl vac uum once every j month S..:hedulnJ
Freeze prorecr lc n sysre m once a year ferins pection and testing Scheduled
Coo ling coil Visua l inspec lion once a year usuall y Scheduled
in spring before coolingsystem SU it
u
Humidi fi er Pneumatic actualor:and diaph r..gm scheduled
once a year end
Fan . Ll.ubncared once every J moolhs schedu led
.1 belts, bearina snd ffiOl:or 21'0:based
"nbreakdollo n ~ly Breakdown
J Inlet vanes are inspecte<!OO\;e
every J months Schoouled
Control sys tem once a year SChedu led
EPrelays Once a yea r Sch eduled
CERR Build in g
Air compressors wi ll be maintenance check once every b months. Th is included change
the oil. test the safety valve. pressu re swi tch . and runnin g the co mpressor in and out.
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